Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts

Tuesday, 28 February 2017

Independent Science Journalist Who Exposes Research Fraud, Ethics Breaches & Corruption Threatened by Lawsuits: Here's How You Can support Him!



As I have been reporting before, no holds barred independent German science journalist Leonid Schneider, who runs the blog For Better Science to expose and call out science fraud, ethics breaches and general scientific hype and institutional corruption, particularly in the life and medical sciences, has recently been hit by civil lawsuits to silence his reporting. Besides the couple of Thorsten and Heike Walles, another exposed former Paolo Macchiarini associate and likely co-fraudster and ethics villain, Philipp Jungebluth, is now also suing Schneider for libel. In both cases, court injunction have already been made threatening Schneider with massive monetary fines or prison time, and he is now facing the substantive economic cost of defending himself in two separate proceedings and, if the court so decides, pay the fines and the legal costs of the plaintiffs. Note that what Schneider has been reporting is only already publicly available and proven facts, so he is not in any way slandering these people, but rather providing an important information service to universities, hospitals, research funders, and potential patients (and possible guinea pigs) of the dear doctors. Of course, the whole thing is a so-called SLAPP operation, to shut Schneider up by scaring him with the financial consequences of continuing his reporting.

To help Schneider manage through this challenge, you may first of all sign this letter of support of his reporting. If you're in such a position, you may also engage Schneider professionally. But he has also set up this crowd funding page, to help everyone who dislike science fraudsters and unethical researchers, as well as the practice of silencing important public reporting by abusing civil law, to pitch in financially. I've become a monthly "patron", but there are many options and you may chose your contribution freely, with more generous amounts providing you with a steady stream of Schneider's homemade satirical science cartoons, such as this one:



Thursday, 7 May 2015

The Philosophy of Hate Crime: Special Section Edited by Myself And David Brax Published By The Journal of Interpersonal Violence


I have been posting a few times over the last couple of years about themes, events and media linked to my engagement in research on philosophical and ethical aspects of hate crimes, hate crime law, and policy relating to this. The engagement originates from my participation in the European Commission funded project When Law and Hate Collide, and I'm now happy to be able to announce the final publication of one of the main academic outputs of this project: A special section of the Journal of Interpersonal Violence on the theme of the philosophy of hate crime, guest-edited by David Brax (my main collaborator in the project) and myself:


http://jiv.sagepub.com/content/30/10.toc

The section features an unusually (for a philosophy publication) diverse collection of specialists, representing philosophy, ethics, law, sociology and criminology, writing on a wide selection of philosophical and ethical aspects of hate crimes and related policy. The table of content looks as follows:


http://jiv.sagepub.com/content/30/10.toc

David Brax's and my introduction, where the theme of the philosophy of hate crime, as well as the content of the individual contributions, are briefly explained, has been made "open access", that is freely available for reading or download by anyone. If you lack the access (through private subscription or your university library or other institutional link) to read the other contributions, please contact the individual authours to obtain copies of their respective articles!









Thursday, 29 January 2015

The Return of Lombroso? Free Access Article On the Ethics of the Scientific Vision of Screening for Risk of Criminality to Prevent Future Crime




One of my research interests is about the way in which medical science and technology may be used and misused for large-scale societal aims, and how that territory should be understood ethically. In Gothenburg, I am happy to be and have been part of the growing research environment of the Centre for Ethics, Law and Mental Health (CELAM), involving collaboration between forensic psychiatry, criminology, psychology, law, neuromedicine, political and care science, philosophy and ethics. In a freesh article coming out of this collaboration, by myself and CELAM director Susanna Radovic, a family of visionary and currently popular ideas – advocated not least by neurocriminology enthusiast Adrian Raine – about using the science of individual causes of crime for preventive screening programmes are analyzed from an ethical standpoint, connecting to the roots of such visions in the notorious ideas of 19th century Italian criminology pioneer Cesare Lombroso. The abstract runs:

The vision of legendary criminologist Cesare Lombroso to use scientific theories of individual causes of crime as a basis for screening and prevention programmes targeting individuals at risk for future criminal behaviour has resurfaced, following advances in genetics, neuroscience and psychiatric epidemiology. This article analyses this idea and maps its ethical implications from a public health ethical standpoint. Twenty-seven variants of the new Lombrosian vision of forensic screening and prevention are distinguished, and some scientific and technical limitations are noted. Some lures, biases and structural factors, making the application of the Lombrosian idea likely in spite of weak evidence are pointed out and noted as a specific type of ethical aspect. Many classic and complex ethical challenges for health screening programmes are shown to apply to the identified variants and the choice between them, albeit with peculiar and often provoking variations. These variations are shown to actualize an underlying theoretical conundrum in need of further study, pertaining to the relationship between public health ethics and the ethics and values of criminal law policy.

We have been fortunate to possess the funds of making the article so-called open access, meaning that it is now free for viewing and download by anyone – no need for subscription or the payment of any fees.

So if the topic of how medicine, science and technology can be used, for better of for worse, for preventing crime, and what are th ethical implications of such possibilities, feel free to sample our attempt at getting an initial grip on trhis topic, here. And should you want to share it along, or post it on a blog or a forum or in an archive, the open access license permits you to do so, as long as no commercial exploitation is involved.

Wednesday, 2 July 2014

Update: Facebook Experiments Lacked Support in User Agreement and May Have Included Minors


I posted yesterday about the ethical and possibly legal ramifications of the already infamous emotional manipulation experiment where researchers tweaked Facebook user feeds and studied ensuing user behaviour. The post yesterday gave links to a number of useful accounts and analyses, but I did also mention my own doubt that the research, including the subsequent publication of the findings, was covered by the Facebook user agreement. Today, Kashmir Hill at Forbes reveals that this is exactly what was the case. Not only did the user agreement not include "research", however, apparently Facebook realised what this meant for the defensibility of the study and retrospectively added "research" to the agreed to activities by users after the study's data collection in January 2012. In addition, it is also revealed that the study inclusion criteria did not exclude minors, and since Facebook allow users down to the age of 13, this means that the researchers may very well have been children without their or their parents' consent.

Both of these revelations are, of course, of substantial importance for the research ethical assessment of the study. Not least is the combination rather damaging not only for Facebook and its study leader Adam Kramer, but also for the non-Facebook employed researchers Jamie Guillory and Jeffrey Hancock. This since it may be assumed that the research ethical assessment that was allegedly performed at their universities, Cornell and the University of California, rested, at least partly, on the presumption of consent being implied by the Facebook user agreement. Moreover, this point is especially sensitive because of the possible enrollment of children, as research ethics standards, regardless of area, is especially adamant on rigorous consent procedures and protection mechanisms for children, as it is for other vulnerable groups, and mandatory involvement of their parents or guardians in one way or another, especially when they are below 15 years of age. Possibly, dirt may therefore spill over also on the journal PNAS's responsible editor Susan T. Fiske of Princeton University, whose responsibility it was to ensure the ethical soundness of the article before publication.

That's ethics. But, of course, today's revelation also means that there may be basis for substantial legal complaints. Not least, since Facebook and the involved universities are based in the USA – the heaven of civil lawsuits for astronomical amounts of money – it seems far from improbable that users who where included in the study may join in a class-action suit against (primarily) Facebook and the involved universities. Whether or not there would be grounds for administrative of criminal legal action is more difficult to assess, as I lack knowledge of sufficient details of the relevant sections of US law.


Saturday, 15 February 2014

Legalised Euthanasia for Children Regardless of Age in Belgium: The Actual Law in English

The past few days we have heard the reports of the change made to the Belgian (permissive, but also restrictive) euthanasia law that makes it include children of all ages among those who may lawfully receive medical help to end their lives. For instance here, here, here and here. None, however, have had access to or quoted any actual English translation of the new law. Thanks to my colleague Kristof Van Assche at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel's Faculty of Law and Criminology, I'm now happy to be able provide one for interested readers, with the following disclaimer: This is Kristof's own provisional translation, based on this English version of the original law and his own added translations of the made changes. Kristof posted it in the closed Facebook group for bioethics scholars, Bioethics International, and gave me permission to share it with a wider audience in this way. Here comes screenshots from the original post just referred to:


And here, to make quotation easier, is the text in plain text:
 
Law of 28 May 2002 on Euthanasia, amended by the Law of 13 February 2014 – Consolidated version [changes in brackets]

Chapter II: Conditions and procedure


Section 3

§1. The physician who performs euthanasia commits no criminal offence when he/she has verified that:
- the patient is a legally competent adult, a legally competent emancipated minor, [or a minor with the capacity of discernment] and is conscious at the moment of making the request;
- the request is voluntary, well-considered and repeated, and is not the result of any external pressure;
- the adult or emancipated minor patient is in a medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated, and that results from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or accident;
- [the minor with the capacity of discernment is in a medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical suffering that cannot be alleviated and that will result in death in the short term, and that results from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or accident;]
and when he/she has respected the conditions and procedure as provided in this Act.

§2. Without prejudice to any additional conditions that the physician may wish to attach to his/her intervention, he/she must in advance and in each case:
1) inform the patient about his/her health condition and life expectancy, discuss with the patient his/her request for euthanasia and the possible therapeutic and palliative courses of action and their consequences. Together with the patient, the physician must come the belief that there is no reasonable alternative to the patient’s situation and that the patient’s request is completely voluntary;
2) be certain of the constant physical or mental suffering of the patient and of the durable nature of his/her request. To this end, the physician has several conversations with the patient spread out over a reasonable period of time, taking into account the progress of the condition of the patient;
3) consult another physician about the serious and incurable nature of the disorder and inform him/her about the reasons for this consultation. The consulted physician reviews the medical record, examines the patient and must be certain of the patient’s constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated. He/she drafts a report on his/her findings.
The consulted physician must be independent of the patient as well as of the treating physician and must be competent to give an opinion about the disorder in question. The treating physician informs the patient about the results of this consultation;
4) if there is a nursing team that has regular contact with the patient, discuss the request of the patient with the team or its members;
5) if the patient so desires, discuss the request of the patient with his/her relatives appointed by him/her;
6) ensures that the patient has had the opportunity to discuss his/her request with the persons that he/she wanted to meet;
7) [when the patient is an unemancipated minor, consult, in addition, a child psychiatrist or a psychologist, and inform him about the reasons for this consultation.
The consulted specialist takes note of the medical record, examines the patient, verifies the capacity of discernment of the minor and certifies this in writing.
The treating physician informs the patient and his or her legal representatives of the outcome of this consultation.
At a meeting with the legal representatives of the minor, the treating physician provides them with all the information specified in §2, 1° in and verifies that they agree with the request of the minor patient.]

§3. […]

§4. The request of the patient [and, if the patient is a minor, also the agreement of the legal representatives] have to be put in writing. The document is drawn up, dated and signed by the patient himself/herself. If the patient is not capable of doing this, the document is drawn up by an adult person who is designated by the patient and must not have any material interest in the death of the patient.
This person indicates that the patient is incapable of putting his/her request in writing and indicates the reasons why. In such case the request is drawn up in the presence of the physician and the said person mentions the name of the physician on the document. This document must be annexed to the medical record.
The patient may revoke his/her request at any time, in which case the document is removed from the medical record and returned to the patient.

[§4/1. After the physician has treated the request of the patient, the persons concerned are offered the possibility of psychological assistance.]

My most sincere thanks to Kristof for allowing me to share.


Wednesday, 21 August 2013

My View of Chelsea (FKA Bradley) Manning's Sentence

NOTE: due to Manning's own request to be referred to by the name of Chelsea and as being of female gender, the original text has been slightly updated on August 23, 2013.

Today, Chelsea Manning (formerly known as Bradley and of male gender through the massive mass media reporting) received her sentence after having been declared guilty on 20 of the 21 charges on which she had been put before military court (several of which she confessed to) for leaking an abundance of classified material, among that the infamous diplomatic cables, to Wikileaks. She was acquitted on the charge of aiding the enemy, which potentially could have motivated life or even a death sentence. The prosecutor had moved for 60 years out of the originally 136, eventually reduced to 90, total maximum years for the crimes for which she was convicted, but the judge settled on a maximum 35 years in military prison (of which she has to serve a third) – some commentators reporting "a minimum of 5.2 years in prison with a 32 year maximum" – without explicit motivation. Commentators, however, refer to Manning's age, her confession, and plea for forgiveness and, not least, the brutal way in which she was treated at the first extended phase of her arrest as reasons for reducing the sentence. The general guess is that counting everything, she may be out in 10 years time from now. The prosecutor has expressed dissatisfaction and stated that the sentencing will be appealed. See here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, just to name a few of the sources available.

Commentators are very varied in their responses, but many on the side of things that I spontaneously sympathize with are making the point that the sentence is overly harsh compared to (a) US soldiers convicted for war crimes, or (b) other people convicted for leaking military or otherwise classified info to the press. The (a) type comment received some extra spunk this tuesday, when the US Director of Justice filed for having a court granting immunity to George W. Bush, Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz against allegations of unlawfully instigating the war in Iraq in a recent suit. Now, I agree in a way with both these types of comments with regard to the unfairness and lack of legal security they expose, and I'm on the record as stating that Manning's actions were not only morally permissible, they were in fact required and admirable and have equally expressed my horror at the infamous video of a US helicopter crew laughing and joyfully gunning down civilians in Iraq. But at the same time I would like to insist on a distinction being made here between normative comments and factual ones. Moreover, among the normative comments, one must distinguish between those pertaining to the single case and those pertaining to the institutional order handling said single case (in this case the US system of criminal justice).

So, normative comments are about, simply, whether or not the sentence is a good thing. Given the moral permissibility of Manning's action to leak the material she did, the answer is simple: no, of course not! But this is mainly because from this same point of view, there should have been no conviction, no court proceedings and no arrest in the first place.

At the same time, this attitude, as I mentioned in my second post on Manning's leaks, is inconsistent with viewing Manning's actions as morally justifiable civil disobedience (since that assumes unlawfulness and that the offender takes the legal consequences). This latter analysis, which I support, brings into the picture the existence of a system of law that there is a value in upholding and allow to rule. Now, it may very well be that such rule of law is unsystematic in the US context, and that, e.g., president Obama has been hypocritical when condemning Manning's action more harshly than those of, e.g. Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the infamous pentagon papers. However, that does not justify undermining rule of law even more. It is quite clear that Manning committed criminal acts when leaking, no matter how morally justified these leaks were. It may very well be that the system of law defining these crimes is perverted in various ways, for instance in that it lets US soldiers who commit heinous war crimes (or political leaders who unlawfully order entire wars, for that matter) off the hook much too easily, but that is merely an argument in favour of harsher sentences in those cases (in the political case, equality before the law and due process in holding politicians legally accountable on the same condition as anyone else), not acquittal, amnesty or a milder sentence in Manning's case. Moreover, this is still a system where everyone, Manning included, had the possibility to understand the legal standing of her actions and what she could to expect in consequence. Much, much worse would be a system were law is just a cheap show, and court verdicts vary according to the momentary whims of those that happen to be in power to enforce whatever preferences they happen to entertain at the moment. That would be the rule where the only law is that of the strongest and no order or system whatsoever exists for anyone, except briefly for those fortunate to be allied with whoever is in momentary power in everyone's war against everyone else; where the life of the common person is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" as Thomas Hobbes so famously remarked. So, in sum, while I may support the claims that there are perversions in the US legal system in its view on crimes connected to the military and imperfections and hypocricy in its application, this does not justify even more of the same.

Now, none of this is to say that Manning's sentence is legally correct or reasonable; I know far too little about the US legal system to be a judge of that. But it seems to me perfectly reasonable (a) that she was convicted for crimes due to her leaks and (b) that she received a substantial sentence for that. This in no way reduces the moral worth of her action to leak, it just underscores that sometimes it is one's moral right and duty to break the law and that this may hold even with regard to laws that are in general quite reasonable (like those protecting military secrets in a world where military conflict is abundant). This is the nature of civil disobedience and, according to standard notions of the conditions for justified such disobedience, you should also face the legal consequences as part of your action. Having reached that conclusion, we can then debate how hard the sentence should be in a case like this (this is very much open to moral argument and judicial discretion in the US legal system as I understand it) and, even more, how soon a pardon should be extended, but those are matters that I leave open.

Instead I close by moving from the normative discussion to a factual one: how should Manning's sentence be assessed in relation to realistic expectations?  In fact, and this is the end of my line of comment, my impression is that the sentence is actually much milder than what was to be expected given the circumstances. These circumstances include: (a) the guilty verdict, (b) the American fondness of (irrationally) harsh sentencing in criminal law, (c) the claim of the prosecution for almost double the jail time eventually settled for by the judge, (d) the maximum sentence for the crimes for which Manning was convicted being almost three times what she received, (e) the nature and circumstances of the actions: leaking military information in the midst of military conflict, (f) the (by me alleged) fact that a large portion of US citizens probably simplistically view Manning as a common traitor and wouldn't have cared less if she had been locked away for good (no nice view of mine of the American people, but hey, I didn't choose they public relations agency, they did – in free elections!) – a harsh sentence thereby bringing no political risk from a legitimacy point of view.

In short: Manning's actions were morally right, required and admirable. It is at the same time quite in order that she has been convicted of crimes and sentenced for that and Americans should all be thankful for living in a society where rule of law prevails (however imperfectly) even when having such unpleasant consequences, albeit it would be even better if US military war criminals were convicted and sentenced proportionally to the seriousness of their crimes, and the President refrained from making statements possibly inconsistent with case law. The reasonableness of the sentence can surely be debated (not least, I would say, taking into account the fact that Manning's intention was to expose serious criminal behaviour that she had good reason to believe would for strategic military reasons have received no attention, had she tried to move the matter internally according to due military process), but given the circumstances the actual sentence is in fact a very, very pleasant surprise! Even more, given these very same circumstances, my reading is that the judge is actually making a (however subtle) statement in Manning's favour!

Wednesday, 31 July 2013

Slides to Two Recent Talks Connecting the Themes of Ethics, Crime and Psychiatry are Now Online

Just to inform that the slides to my two talks at the 33rd International Congress of Law and Mental Health, held in Amsterdam earlier this summer, are now available online for viewing, download and sharing via my Academia.edu site. Both talks represent work in progress, where I am in the beginning of combining thinking on different topics that I have been touching on in isolation before, but which are nevertheless related through their connection to certain aspects of criminal law policy connecting to medical views of human nature.

They are:

1. The Return of Lombroso? Ethical and Philosophical Aspects of  (Visions of) Forensic Screening

Abstract
Italian nineteenth century criminologist Cesare Lombroso is notorious for his seminal ideas about criminality and anti-social behaviour resulting from physiological anomalies that should be detected by society and used for forensic preventive purposes. After an extended period of disrepute following World War II, similar ideas have been resurrected in psychiatry, genetics, neurology and criminology in the past decade or two. In particular, there is a growing focus on early detection and application of preventive measures. This development actualizes a complex web of ethics and policy issues having to do with the well-known fact that screening and prevention in the health area are far from ethically clear-cut activities and actualize vivid prospects of doing extensive harm to individuals as well as society. Also, taken to its extreme, it actualizes the idea of using prenatal or preimplantation testing to preselect against children with a predisposition for criminal or antisocial behaviour. In the forensic case, such screening-prevention strategies will connect further to a complicated issue about the proper use of risk-assessment models for societal decision-making for precautionary purposes. Based on former work in all of these areas, this presentation will outline and analyze the basic issue of the defensibility of activities of this sort, with the perspective of forestalling unintentional harm to individuals and society.

And.....

2. Hate Crime, Mental Disorder and Criminal Responsibility

Abstract
Hate crimes are ordinary crimes committed in connection with a negatively prejudiced, biased, disparaging, or antagonistic attitude towards the victim in terms of a perceived membership of a social group. Some hate crimes are elaborate political acts of terror or elaborate persecution, some are so-called “hate speech”, but the overwhelming majority are instances of mundane criminality, involving everything from murder to theft and harassment. Hate crime policies rest on the idea that the bias or “hate”feature make such crimes worse, and that offenders for this reason should be held more firmly responsible. At the same time, the attitude of making a crime into a hate crime involves more or less distorted ideas about reality, together with a willingness to transgress social norms on that basis. In some cases, these views amount to major delusions, resistant to rational scrutiny. In other cases, we may move closer to a point where the belief-desire cluster can be seen as ordinary negligence. Thus, many hate crimes have features that may be argued acting to diminish responsibility according to standard ideas in the philosophy of punishment. The presentation maps underlying value conflicts, tensions, and incoherence in legal practice connected to this complexity of criminal law.

Enjoy for what it's worth!

Thursday, 13 June 2013

Gene Patents: Told You So!

Just this minute, I was reached by the terrific news that the US supreme court has finally ruled against patenting of human genes: here here, here, here, here, here. The ruling itself can be downloaded here.

With respect to my interest in this matter from the point of view of promoting science, health and the interests of patients and the general public, expressed in former posts here and here, this is mainly to rub it in: told you so!!! 

Thursday, 30 May 2013

Video: The Philosophy of Hate Crime: Concepts, Values and Tensions in the European Context

As some may have noticed, from time to time I have posted materisls and ideas coming out of a European research project on hate crime policy of which I have been a part. The project When Law and Hate Collide is now officially over, but material will keep coming out throughout this as well as the next few years. For instance, at the moment, me and my philsopher colleague in the project, David Brax, are in the process of preparing a special issue on the philosophy of hate crime of the cross-disciplinary research periodical Journal of Interpersonal Violence, to appear in 2014, and earlier this year, we made public our report on the philosophy of hate crime, available open access for online reading and download by clicking the link above.

Now you can also view online videos from the final conference of the project, held in Brussels, January 29, available via youtube here, and the presentation of our philosophical perspective, The Philosophy of Hate Crime: Concepts, Values and Tensions in the European Context, is embedded for direct viewing here below (the slides are not very visible on the video, so these can be downloaded separately via the link above)!



All earlier posts connecting to this project, including videos from earlier symposia on the philosophy as well as psychology of hate crime, are here.

Saturday, 16 March 2013

Continuing Official Catholic Confusion on the Morality of Child Molestation, Rape and Pedophilia


A new Pope has just been elected and immediately, one of the very cardinals that took part in the election-process (the so-called Conclave) is on the news making a massive fool of himself, as well as illustrating that the complete confusion and ethical morass within the official Catholic institutional establishment has not become any less than before. I have from time to time commented just a little bit on the amazing stupidity and deepest immorality of central official institutions and representatives of the Catholic Church when it comes to its dealing with allegations of systematic sexual child abuse against their own clergy. I am therefore not very surprised at this latest piece of folly that is reported in my country's leading daily this morning (here):

In a BBC interview, the Arch Bishop of Durban, one Wilfrid Fox Napier, states that child molesters and rapists are not properly to be held criminally responsible for their actions. While I'm not at all surprised that a Catholic Cardinal and Arch Bishop holds and expresses such an opinion – even less so since he represents the South African wing of the Church, known since before for airing massively confused official statements on sexual morality – I do have a few things to say about the way in which he tries to support it.

Here is what he says on the matter, quoting from the BBC interview:
'Cardinal Napier referred to paedophilia as "a psychological condition, a disorder".
"What do you do with disorders? You've got to try and put them right.
"If I - as a normal being - choose to break the law, knowing that I'm breaking the law, then I think I need to be punished."
He said he knew at least two priests, who became paedophiles after themselves being abused as children.
"Now don't tell me that those people are criminally responsible like somebody who chooses to do something like that. I don't think you can really take the position and say that person deserves to be punished. He was himself damaged."'
 Let us break down the argument in steps. Adding some hidden premises that are apparently assumed by the good Arch Bishop, the most likely (and potential least faulty) version would look something like this. It is rather complicated and partly sophisticated, and therefore needs to be presented in separate bundles of deductions, where I have put the important conclusions in bold type:

1. Pedophilia is a psychological disorder
2. Psychological disorders are conditions and not actions
3. People cannot be properly held criminally responsible for anything else than those of their actions that break the law
4. People cannot be properly held criminally responsible for being pedophiles

5. Sexual child abuse is caused by pedophilia

6. If an action that breaks the law is caused by a psychological disorder for which he/she cannot properly be held criminally responsible, then the person who performs it does not know that he/she is thereby breaking the law
7. If a person performs an unlawful action without knowing that it is against the law, then he/she cannot properly be held criminally responsible for performing that action.
8. If a person performs an action as a result of pedophilia, then he/she cannot properly be held criminally responsible for performing that action
9. No one can properly be held criminally responsible for sexual child abuse.

10. If an action that breaks the law is caused by a psychological disorder for which he/she cannot properly be held criminally responsible, then the person who performs it has not chosen to perform it
11. If a person performs an unlawful action without choosing to do so, then he/she cannot properly be held criminally responsible for performing that action.
12. Same as 8
13 Same as 9

14. Therefore (by 4, 5, 9 and 13): No one can properly be held criminally responsible for sexual child abuse

It is quite easy to spot the gaps, as well as the sinister rhetorical tricks employed, in this argument. To begin with the latter, the basis of Mr. Napier's argument is the completely plausible claim that pedophilia is a psychological disorder and that the criminal law system should not punish people for  having disorders. On this, I presume, we may all agree – pedophilia is in this respect no different from, e.g. psychopathy or kleptomania or, for that matter, the flu, being taller than 2 metres or shortsightedness. The law holds people people responsible for what they do – possibly in combination with why they did it – not for what they are. This is trivia, which the dear Bishop tries to create an impression having bearing on whether or not we should be held responsible for our actions.

However, as soon as the first step in that direction is taken (premise 5), trouble begins. For, as a matter of fact, it is by no means obviously true that sexual child abuse is caused by pedophilia. The thing is, you see, that it is rather the case that to the extent that someone is a pedophile in the sense that makes it into a disorder this simply means that they are prone to sexually abuse children, and the only indicator of that is that they in fact do so. That is, if someone is a pedophile in the sense of a disorder, then this is partly constituted by having on at least some occasion sexually abused a child. Similar things hold for many other psychological conditions that may be held out as disorders, such as sadism. Now, you might object that we may imagine someone who harbours sexual desires directed at children, but does not act on them – at least not in the form of actual abuse (but, e.g. fantasy only) and that such a person should be called a pedophile. Sure, I'd say, we may very well do so, but in that case, premise 1 of the argument becomes implausible, since what makes it sensible to say that a pedophile suffers from a psychological disorder is that this person does not direct his/her actions properly on the basis of prudence or social, moral or legal norms. It may further be observed, that if we thus would weaken the concept of pedophilia, premises 6 and 10 would be severely weakened as well. So, if this argument is to work, we need to hold on to a strong concept of pedophilia, where it means simply tendency to sexually abuse children and that, of course, does not tell us that pedophilia causes sexual child abuse, merely that acts sexual child abuse is an indicator of the mentioned tendency – i.e. pedophilia. The cause of the actions of sexual child abuse is not revealed.

However, just as the weaker concept of pedophilia would make trouble for premises 6 and 10, we can now see that also the stronger would – besides invalidating premise 5 that is. For the tendency to sexually molest children when provided with a (from the perpetrator's point of view) fitting opportunity would not, it seems to me, provide any reason to believe that a person having such a tendency is either unable to understand or know that sexual child abuse is against the law, or incapable of choosing to sexually abuse children. On the contrary, this tendency whereby the person selects certain occasions to perform acts of sexual child abuse, in fact supports the notion of them both knowing very well that it is against the law and performing acts of reasoning to make decisions about when to try to get away with the unlawful act and when not to. In short neither the fact that your actions result from an urge, or that they result from a tendency in virtue of past actions, invalidates that you may properly be held legally responsible for them. This is perfectly consistent with accepting the claim that such a person is not to be properly held criminally responsible for said urge or tendency, but for his/her actions.

So, why is the dear bishop making such a flawed argument? One explanation is, of course, the he is himself confused. However, a much more charitable and less insulting explanation is that he is doing his best to do what catholic officials always seem to be doing when the topic of sexual child abuse by clergy is raised – namely to protect his peers and defend the way in which the Catholic Church has been handling these things – that is, shielding hard criminals from the criminal justice system and on many occasions providing them with the opportunity to go on destroying the lives of children and youngsters in their care.

To see how this fits Mr. Napier's line of argument, we can inspect some possible corollaries (sub-conclusions) of its alleged conclusion (14). If 14 is true, it follows:

15. No Catholic clergy can properly be held criminally responsible for sexual child abuse

And if we for a moment forget that, legally and morally, we should all report suspected unlawful acts to the proper authorities, so that they can be investigated and decided on according to due process, thereby protecting legal security and rule of law, it would also follow:

16. The Catholic Church or its representatives are under no obligation to report suspected cases of sexual child abuse by clergy

So, as usual it comes down to the usual thing: trying to get away with it.

Saturday, 9 February 2013

A Moral Theory of Online "Hate" Harassment and Attacks

First of all: most of the links in the beginning of this post are in Swedish - English links are highlighted with bold text. My direct familiarity with the issue is from Sweden, hence the language of most links, but I know that the issue is general and is discussed in many settings around the world.

Second of all: a quick little addendum was made just now (5 minutes after 1st posting) regarding the "internet dickwad" theory, that Fredrik Falk made me aware of. See further below......

In my country, there have been repeated public debates about the completely unacceptable and many times obviously criminal behaviour of some people when they use the anonymity of online resources to react to other people's open and publicly expressed opinions. In particular against women, especially those who express some sort of view on gender, family or sexuality related policy issues. And then we have what happens to all of us who dare to breathe even a syllable about migration or refugee policy that is not perfectly in line with the PC militia of the new wave of European racism - what I in a series of posts a few years ago called "nationism". Other topics which seem to feed these people are, of course, issues about religion and society, and (perhaps a bit more surprising) environmental politics, such as climate change policy. However, in many cases it seems that it suffices that the victim is of female gender, appear to be an immigrant or have dark complexion, or is perceived as something else that a straight heterosexual in his or her sexual orientation.

Recently, these debates have received a renewed momentum, as a large group of Swedish female public figures, journalists, debaters, bloggers, etc. – but also ordinary women engaging themselves in public discussions online – have gone public with what sort of awful filth they are exposed to from a presumably minor but apparently very active group of people. Even our prime minister has publicly identified the problem as serious and said that steps need to be taken. Several of these net haters behave identical to the so-called "internet warriors" of racist/nationist parties and more loosely coordinated anti-muslim or -semit groups, or generally xenophopic or anti-immigration activist movements, although sometimes they in fact belong to the opposite end of the right-left political scale (here). The phenomenon has been the subject of in-depth critical journalist scrutiny, as well as prime time news and debates in national TV and articles in newspapers and media magazines (here, here, here, here, here, here, here to name just a few) – in fact, the comment field of the national TV website had to be closed due to a tsunami of hate-reactions to the exposing of the haters – and also given echo in Norway. A few renderings in English of these recent events are here and here. Currently, the press is continuously publishing stories of more locally or less politically active people who have fallen victims to these sort of attacks and it is apparent that the phenomenon is systematic and much more widespread and serious as a threat to freedom of speech and opinion than previously acknowledged (here, here, here, here, to name just a few).

The behaviour of the "net haters", as the established term has come to be, is often equivalent or very close to criminal harassment, libel, threat or incitement to any of these or even violent crime. However, existing laws are obviously not constructed for a situation where these sort of patterns are the rule and occur in a systematic and coordinated (albeit perhaps not always in a specifically planned) way. Thus, although experts have claimed it to be rather easy to identify who the haters actually are and although sometimes these people seem to think that being on the internet as such provides protection – as in this fantastic display of stupidity and total lack of spine or sense of responsibility, when young female radio host Cissi Wallin on air phones up the guy behind a twitter account that has posted direct death threats – it has proven difficult for the police to investigate or prioritise this probable criminality (see also here, here) due to how existing laws and law enforcement regulation are written. Thus, demands have been made for stricter and tougher legislation and instructions to the police and responsible ministers seem ready to act (here, here, here, here, here).

At the same time, as had it been pre-ordered, we have another sort of reaction – the idea of the haters themselves as either victims or, at least, guiltless due to structural forces that direct their actions. The former type of reasoning is, of course, a well known spineless tactic from the new racist movement – it's your own fault that you're being attacked, you should count on it when saying such things as you do. Not so little resembling the rapist's or molester's so-called defense that "her dress/smile/dance/intoxication made me do it" (surprisingly similar to the orthodox islamist motivation for obligatory veils for women, by the way). I will not link to any of the numerous sites where this type of reaction is displayed, since I don't want to give them the favor of a backlink and extra hits. The latter reaction has been exemplified by self-professed internet activist Oscar Swartz, who launches the familiar thesis that the actions are so to speak not what they appear to be but "really" an understandable and predictable reaction to a hopeless situation in tough time regarding economy an employment. This is a refrain that has been regularly repeated before and also in similar areas, such as attempts to understand growing sympathies for racist/nationist parties, and so on. I realise that this sort of theory is both widespread and tempting. However, this structural theory is blatantly false, and I will close this post by explaining why and put forward an alternative and to my eyes much more plausible hypothesis in terms of individual moral psycho-behavioural qualities.

If you want to claim that the behaviour exhibited by the net haters is dependent on or explained by either (i) objectively tough economic circumstances or powerlessness (private or generally in society) or (ii) subjective experience of such things, you need to show: (a) that net haters as a rule are in condition (i) or (ii), and you need to show (b) that anyone in (either of) those conditions will be prone to exhibit the net hate behaviour. I will not speak of part (a) of the necessary argument besides noting that it is far from established, partly because the haters continue to hide behind online anonymity. However, let us for the sake of discussion grant that (a) is true. This brings us to (b) and it is here that the real troubles for the structural theory of net hate begins. Bluntly put: this theory cannot explain the fact that many (in fact, the overwhelming majority of) people who are in circumstances (a) are not exhibiting net hate behaviour, although they have access to the necessary technical resources. So what is the alternative explanation that would take care of that part of the story as well? I suggest that it has to be partly in terms of certain individual psycho-behavioural qualities that most people associate with clear-cut moral values in a pretty straightforward way. My idea is not that these qualities explain net hate by themselves, but rather that they need to complement the sort of suggestions that the structural theory provides, so I will not juxtapose it to that idea and call it "individualist". At the same time, the theory I propose much better than a purely structural theory manages to capture what makes us react to this phenomenon and want something done about it. Therefore I will call it a moral theory of net hate.

To get to this theory, then, let's start with the vague idea behind the structural theory that feelings of powerlessness, insecurity, of being under threat and so on lead to the net hate behaviour. The mechanism assumed in this supposed explanation is a psychology with several parts, but one of them is that conditions like the ones mentioned produce aggression when triggered by things (such as voiced opinions) not in line with one's own perception of things, attitudes or way of life. Let us, once again, for the sake of discussion accept this (although, I am far from convinced of such a simple causal pattern to be true to the facts). This would mean that also all of those people who are not net haters, but are in the condition of having feelings of powerlessness, insecurity, et cetera will have aggression likewise triggered. However, since they are not net haters, obviously, such triggered aggression does not automatically produce the net hating behaviour. Another mechanism typically assumed by the structural argument is that, due to the condition of the hater, the hate act will provide him or her with a benefit – typically feelings of security, control, power, and so on, that align with the initial state in a way that provides an incentive to further similar behavíour, and so on. In short: net hating is a bit like addiction. However, once again, apparently there are a lot of people who are not steered in this direction although they are in the initial condition – either because the (assumed) triggered aggression does not produce the promise of this sort of benefit, or that such a promise does not motivate enough for the net hate behaviour to follow. In effect, there has to be some additional qualities of the net haters that make them behave as they do. What may that be? I have three combined and complementary suggestions:

1. Lack of insight about the fate of the victims. The hater does not "really realise" the damage he or she does, for instance due to distance, active objectification, and so on.
2. Lack of concern for the fate of the victims. The hater at heart understands very well what harm is inflicted, but does not care enough to be motivated, for instance, since the hater is actually gratified by the thought of that harm.
3. Lack of consideration in light of existing concern for the fate of the victim, the hater lets other motives (such as longing for the gratification of feeling powerful or secure through the suffering of others) direct his or her actions.
4. Lack of willingness to take responsibility in light of the prospect of exhibiting the hate behaviour without "getting caught" at it.

If some or all of these features are added to (some of) the ones already mentioned, I suggest that we come close to a model that can explain net hate behaviour. Especially item 4 is, I suggest, an important ingredient together with the technical fact that the internet provides ample opportunities for (at least self-perceived) anonymity. It may be, however, that some haters are not so concerned with "getting away with it", and in those cases 4 will not be essential.

Now, all of these qualities of a person are, I suggest, associated with widely embraced moral opinions. More exactly, they motivate why the behaviour of the net haters is both default morally wrong, and lacks valid special excuses. The framework of the structural factors around the net hater's behaviour does not alter, but rather serves to underscore this.

First, the lack of insight, to the extent that is in place, can be seen in parallel with criminal negligence: we are supposed to understand that what we say or do to other people may affect them in a negative way and we are likewise supposed to take care and think over whether or not our actions may have such effects. Being in a hurry, excited or similar things is not a valid excuse for not taking such care, especially in blatant cases like threatening to kill or maim or assault someone sexually.

Second, the lack of concern is an attitude that may be compared to that of a sadist – someone who understands that he or she harms other people, but who doesn't care because he or she likes it. But ideally we are supposed to be motivated and thus concerned. In fact, in most cases this features would be considered an aggravating circumstance rather than an excuse.

Third, the sadist, just as the net hater who lacks the appropriate concern for the well-being of the victim, may escape serious moral criticism if he or she restrains him- or herself. That is, just as any of us who may at times be motivated to do nasty things to other people out of aggression, fear, coldheartedness or pure egoism, may control ourselves by activating other parts of our motivational system – such as moral rules about not seriously harming other people unnecessarily, being considerate and civil, and so on. Pretty simple and straightforward norms that we can assume net haters to know perfectly well and therefore judge their behaviour harshly when they so blatantly overstep them. And if they should claim that they don't know about these norms, we can move back to item number one and argue a negligence defect for which they are in fact culpable.

Fourth, I do think that many instances of net hate are crimes of opportunity, so to speak, very dependent on the fact that the hater believes that he or she can do it without being identified or confronted. As I said, there may be situations where this is not the case, but when it is, it adds two further layers of moral deficiency. One is that of lack of willingness to take responsibility. The other, of course, is that of culpable cowardice. Of course, both of these reasons for degrading their behaviour morally even more, is what they have in common with most other petty criminals.

It is important to note, that factor no. 4 is, so to speak, parasiting on one or several of the others. That is, I am not here subscribing to this suggestion:



After all, most of us succeed in behaving pretty ok on the internet, if nothing else because we take the effort of restraining ourselves.

It is of extra importance to note that the institutions of free speech, opinion and expression in liberal democratic societies in fact rest on the presumption that people keep within the sort of moral limits just set out. It may of course, be debated exactly how harmful a behaviour needs to be for the limits to the just mentioned freedoms to be approached. But what in any other circumstance would be considered as unlawful threat, libel or harassment is clearly residing in this territory. This will leave plenty of room for all the nastiness and edge we need in public debates – if, in fact, we actually need that at all. The importance of this type of limit is, of course, that without it the mentioned institutions lose their ability to do their job in a good society. If they are regularly limited due to the fear of people to speak their mind because of the reactions they may receive from haters, this is equivalent to a situation where the state itself acts to instill such fear. And then, we are no longer living in a bona fide liberal democracy. The only reason to tread cautiously is the very same concern, not to overstep the boundaries of defensible public debating within the framework of free speech. In light of the rather clear moral boundaries being overstepped by the net haters, this to my eyes presents no serious problem.

Sunday, 27 January 2013

Follow the 4th Hate Crime Symposium via web streaming!

As you may recall, I have now and again posted in connection to the project When Law and Hate Collide, where I and my assistant David Brax have been active since two years, collaborating with researchers at the law school of the University of Central Lancashire and psychologists and special education researchers at the Göthe Universität Frankfurt. These earlier posts are all assembled here, and among other things they link to videos from symposia arranged within the project in 2011 and 2012.

We are now in the final stages of this project and on tuesday we will hold the final and 4th of these symposia. This will take place on Tuesday, the 29th of January, starting 9 a.m. (CET) in Brussels, but for anyone who wants to follow it, it will be streamed on the web. To do this, 9 a.m. on tuesday, you simply click this link, and the live streaming should start. If there is a problem, wait a while and try again.

The program includes the following presentations:

Bogusia Puchalska (Uclan): European-wide policy and initiatives on hate crime

Christian Munthe & David Brax (Gothenburg): The philosophy of hate crime: concepts, values and tensions in the European context

Michael Fingerle & Caroline Bonnes (Frankfurt): A different perception? What NGOs and victims think about hate crime legislation

Michael Salter & Kim McGuire (Uclan): Issues concerning the victim's recollection of hate crime: avoiding revictimisation

- Keynote invited comments from:
Paul Iganski (Hate crime scholar, Lancaster University)

Joanna Perry (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE).

Paul Gianassi (Hate crime law enforcement expert, UK Ministry of justice)

Henri Nickels (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA)

See you on the web, if not in Brussels!



Saturday, 28 January 2012

Cross-Post: Crime, Punishment and Responsibility (Series Index) via Philosophical Disquisitions

So, here's a nice one from the philosophy blog world. John Danaher, lecturer in law at Keele University (also found on twitter), who runs the very nice philosophy blog Philosophical Disquisitions has posted what is effectively a hypertext table of contents to an edited web-volume of blog-posts on the broad topic of free will, responsibility and punishment. Great stuff for the advanced student or generally interested reader, as well as colleagues engaged in these issues. John continues his pursuit of issues in this direction, so after you have gone through the posts indexed in the contents, you can move on to his latest, on the topic of the concept of being liable for attempted crimes. Here's the TOC cross-posted:


1. Free Will and Moral Responsibility


2. Theories of Punishment

3. Criminal Responsibility and Liability

Friday, 9 December 2011

Videos from The Philosophy of Hate Crime Symposium.

As some of you may recall, in a post earlier this fall, I shared videos from a symposium arranged by a project I'm working in on the basis for European hate crime policy, and informed about a 2nd symposium on philosophical issues actualised in that context that we arranged here in Gothenburg. Even earlier I have made a few posts on issues actualised by the project (on the relation between hate crimes and human rights and on the role of prevention in a sound hate crime policy) and pointed to many more at the blog of my colleague David Brax.

We are now happy to be able to share videos of almost all of the presentations and attached discussions that took place during the Philosophy of Hate Crime Symposium, arranged by David and me at the University of Gothenburg a few months ago. As I myself fell ill on the 2nd day, you will only see me appear in the introduction, but David does a splendid job of holding together by himself what was originally our shared presentation on such short notice in the last video below.

One of the more nice things that I noticed when watching this footage right through was how surprisingly well it captures the atmosphere and spirit at what was a bona fide research workshop, rather than a public engagement event put together for that particular purpose. What you see is an example of what goes on in the laboratory of a research unit in the humanities and social sciences, basically. Welcome to take a peak!

1. Anthony Mark Cutter & Christian Munthe: Introduction to When Law and Hate Collide


2. Paul Iganski: How Hate Hurts: The Moral Philosophical Basis of Hate Crime Laws 



3. Barbara Perry: Moving Beyond "Hate" Crime 



4. Neil Chakraborti: Targetting Vulnerability - A Fresh Set of Challanges for Hate Crime Scholarship 



5. Heidi Hurd: Criminalizing Hate, Criminalizing Character



6. Mohamad Al Hakim: Hate as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing 



7. Antti Kauppinen: Two Kinds of Expressive Harm 



8. David Brax: A Tentative Philosphical Framework for Hate Crime Policy Across the European Union

Tuesday, 29 November 2011

Why Anders Behring Breivik is Probably both Criminally Insane and Legally Accountable

Today, the Norwegian forensic psychiatric experts assigned the task to assess whether or not Anders Behring Breivik (the perpetrator of the Oslo bombings and the mass murders on Utøya) is legally accountable under Norwegian law – Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim – delivered their report. Their conclusion is that Behring Breivik was suffering from a serious psychiatric illness (paranoid psychosis) when committing his crimes (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here). News-reports unanimously declare that this makes it very likely that Behring Breivik will be ruled legally unaccountable for his crimes. Perhaps they are right, but is he unaccountable? Really?

I suggest that, in this case, we see an example of how severe psychotic illness need not, as a matter of fact, imply moral or legal unaccountability.

According to the psychiatrists who have made the evaluations, ABB describes severe delusions of paranoia, megalomania and grandeur (ABB experienced himself as an appointed defender of the Norwegian people against the horrible threat of muslims, a forthcoming king, et cetera). They also describe him as both suicidal and very dangerous to the the public and, reportedly there are speculations of ABB possibly having been sexually molested as a small child.

Now, of these points, the last two ones have no implication whatsoever for either the medical question (is ABB clinically mentally ill?) or the legal question of accountability. The presence of a risk of suicide may be an indicator of mental illness, but not necessarily at the time of the crimes, albeit possibly motivating psychiatric care no matter how the ensuing legal process falls out. However, the delusions of ABB (which I for now assume that the psychiatrist have ascertained not having been fabricated by ABB) without doubt describe a case of severe psychosis. In fact these descriptions alone are sufficient for declaring ABB seriously mentally ill at the time of the crimes.

Now, when the concept of moral and legal unaccountability are discussed, severe psychosis is one of the paradigmatic cases held out. Someone suffering from severe psychosis is the iconic representation of being stark raving mad and, for sure, no one in such a state can be accountable for their actions. Right? Well....., as you might guess, I will question this inference.

The classic idea of moral and legal accountability connects intimately to the legal notion of culpa – the idea of a wrongful action being someone's 'fault'. The idea is that if you are unaccountable this cannot be the case for you even if the action was wrong (against the law) and was physically caused by movements of your body. This, for instance, is how we view offenses committed by small children, sleepwalkers, and so on. Now, the classic doctrine of legal accountability states two main conditions: (1) understanding of the nature of the act, (2) ability to control the performance of the act. If you lack enough of any of these, you are legally unaccountable and cannot be guilty of a crime.

Around the world, there is some variation as to how (1) and (2) are interpreted (if you want to dive into issues and problems implied by this and other peculiarities around the meeting of psychiatry and the law, have a look here and here). In particular, it varies how tightly connected the concept is to clinical psychiatric terminology and methods. In the end, however, accountability is a legal or moral, not a psychiatric notion, so there is no conceptual or logical necessity involved in taking the step from a clinical diagnosis to a legal verdict. In any case, the typical case of severe psychosis will normally be viewed as activating at least clause (1) and sometimes also clause (2). This, however, seems to depend on the fact that common psychotic delusions are not like ABB's.

The psychotic delusions of ABB described by the psychiatric experts according to the reports have a common theme. They are all about ABB imagining there to be a sound and valid moral justification for what he did. He is convinced that Norway is threatened by an invasion of dangerous muslims, and that the Norwegian establishment forms a fifth column to this threat against an imagined "real" Norway, where "real" Norwegians truly want him to take the actions that he eventually did take. Now, the first part of this delusion is actually not very different from the one apparently held by rather a lot of European voters these days. Thoughts in this direction have been commonplace in the rhetoric of the new European racist political movement, which I analysed in a series of blog posts a while back. The second part seems to be no worse than the average world view of your typical conspiracy theorist (most of whom walk about as free persons). It is the third part, it seems to me, that makes ABB seriously mentally disturbed; the fact that his mind facilitates a world-view which provides a justification (of sorts) for him – ABB – to take bold and normally unlawful and deeply immoral action. The perceived threat and the lack of trust in authorities to prevent the threat may as such just as well lead to apathy or emigration. But combined with the third idea of having a special mission from the "real" Norwegian people to commit destruction and mass murder we have a severe mental illness. Obviously, then, diagnosing a mental illness has a substantial moral element. It is the presence of a delusion that allows ABB to break the most important of laws and moral prohibitions there are with an intact conscience that makes him clearly mentally ill – besides being egocentric, delusional, weird and racist.

However, while this is good reason to declare ABB as severely mentally ill, it is not a case for claiming him not to fall under any of the two conditions of accountability mentioned above. ABB clearly understood that he was killing people against their will and that this is a crime. He also understood that under normal circumstances even he would judge these act to be seriously morally wrong (thus the need for a delusional reason for why they where permissible in this case), so he obviously was fully capable of understanding what it means for an action to be wrong in both the legal and moral sense. Moreover, the whole story of his deeds is a witness of someone in full control of his actions. ABB did clearly not do as he did because he could not help himself, he did it because he really wanted to. He choose to do it and he was as able as anybody else doing something wrong to choose something else instead. The psychosis, moreover, did not expose ABB to any immediately threatening hallucinations that might have been a reason to declare his actions as sprung out of panic.

Here is my reading: ABB was indeed severely clinically psychotic when committing his crimes. But this psychosis had nothing to do with his understanding of the nature of the act or his ability to control it. Or, to the extent that a perceived moral justification is to be included in a person's understanding of an act, he was no less able to understand the nature of his act than anybody else committing a serious crime in the belief of being morally justified. Such as the criminal effectively embracing ethical egoism in caring nothing for his victims and all for himself, such as the Israeli hit squads that went after Nazi war criminals and the ones responsible for the Munich attacks, such as the band of bankrobbing and murdering neo-nazis that have just been apprehended in Germany, such as the very islamist terrorists that were on ABB's mind. And so on.

All of these might, using the clinical tools of psychiatry be declared to suffer from severe psychotic delusions in the same way that ABB does. But all of them are nevertheless fully accountable for what they did. And so is Anders Behring Breivik.