Forget the "Editing" Hype: Human Genome Action Painting Attempted in China

Recently, there's been a lot of hype around what's been referred to as genome editing. What it's all about is that there's a new bioetechnological strategy for effecting genetic modification in organisms, called CRISPR/Cas9, that has shown promise in facilitating more precise and specific changes of a genome more effectively than before. This is an important advance for laboratory biology research, as the effecting of specific genetic changes in the genome of organisms and study of how these "behave" in response to various stimuli, in different environments, and reproductively over generations is a basic way of advancing knowledge of basic biological mechanisms. However, as usual, there has also been some lack of temperance among those who immediately want to move the new promising lab-tool into practical "in vivo" applications, sparking calls for a global moratorium on practical application, akin to that famously adopted in 1974 at the Asilomar Conference to apply to the then novel recombinant DNA technology. In addition, there has been especially forceful calls to abstain from "editing" a human genetic germ line. The reasoning is an apparently sound precautionary argument to the effect that before practical applications are attempted, sufficient understanding of the technology, its potentials and limits, possible consequences and suitable security protocols, need to be attained and put into place.

At the same time, when new technologies are hyped like this, my bioethics alarm bells start ringing loudly for a number of reasons. We know from a long series of hyped new technologies that, while they may indeed over time prove to be advances compared to what has been previously available (though by far not always), the promises of new "clean", "precise" tool that will effect all that we aim for without any side-effects or mistakes is usually as credible as the promises of precision warfare foreboding the 2003 Iraq invasion – or worse. What one mustn't forget is that there are almost always substantial vested interests around, that have high stakes in having the tech they personally hold patents for, or stock in start-up companies that do, or have stakes in institutes or universities that do, and so on, appear in much better light that there is actual evidence to support. And, in this respect, CRISPR-Cas9 is no different. This is a basic reason to primarily interpret any positive claim about the technology outside of the bona fide peer reviewed scientific literature as part of a marketing campaign aimed at upping the the price of licensing fees, credit rating of the patent holder, attraction for external financial investors, and (if it is a start-up company) stock price pending a coming introduction into a stock exchange or a emission of new shares. Other agents with similar vested interests include those who have already invested in the product somehow, or those who want to peddle quack junk to people under the guise of novel science, much in the spirit the infamous stem cell clinics that continue to jack money out of the hands of conned, often desperate, people.

So, for me, it was no surprise when the reality of the "editing" showed its true face when a group of Chinese researcher recently applied it to human in vitro embryos (modified, so that they could never have resulted in a living human baby, but also never implanted to effect a pregnancy). What we learn from this study is that if there's any honesty among gene modification scientists, the "editing" misnomer should be dropped immediately:

The team injected 86 embryos and then waited 48 hours, enough time for the CRISPR/Cas9 system and the molecules that replace the missing DNA to act — and for the embryos to grow to about eight cells each. Of the 71 embryos that survived, 54 were genetically tested. This revealed that just 28 were successfully spliced, and that only a fraction of those contained the replacement genetic material. “If you want to do it in normal embryos, you need to be close to 100%,” Huang says. “That’s why we stopped. We still think it’s too immature.”
His team also found a surprising number of ‘off-target’ mutations assumed to be introduced by the CRISPR/Cas9 complex acting on other parts of the genome.

What we seem to be looking at in the reality outside of the hype is some sort of human genome action painting, where now and then a drop of the right colour lands in the right place, several other drops land where we absolutely do not want them to, but most of the result is just general heap of pint randomly applied by these the Jackson Pollocks of human genetics.

Moratorium? No shit?!!

European Court Rules Against (almost all) Patenting of Embryonic Stem Cells

Yesterday, the European Court publicized its ruling on the controversial case of the patentability of human emryonic stem cell lines (hESC) in European law. I have discussed this issue in two former posts: here and here. The complete ruling can be found here and is quite long, but the conclusions are clear:

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions must be interpreted as meaning that:

–        any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted, and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute a ‘human embryo’;

–        it is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific developments, whether a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44.

2.      The exclusion from patentability concerning the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes set out in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44 also covers the use of human embryos for purposes of scientific research, only use for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it being patentable.

3.      Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44 excludes an invention from patentability where the technical teaching which is the subject-matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, whatever the stage at which that takes place and even if the description of the technical teaching claimed does not refer to the use of human embryos.

In short, hESC lines can indeed be patented, but as part of a procedure for "for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it". In other words, patenting of hESC lines for the purpose of regenerative medical purposes or research is ruled out within the jurisdiction of European patent law.

Bad Arguments on All Sides in the European Embryonic Stem Cells Legal Circus, part 2

So, this is the second part of a post begun a few days ago. I'll repeat the bare bones of what it's all about:

In March, Nature News reported, a judge at the European Court of Justice (the decisions of which are binding for all EU member countries) named Bot (forename unknown) brought forth the proposal that patenting embryonic stem cell lines would be unlawful, since they have been produced through a process involving the destruction of embryos. Thus, the judge argued, (as reported by Nature News) "they are tantamount to making industrial use of human embryos", which (quoting the judge) would be contrary to "ordre public and morality". The proposal follows a motion made by Greenpeace to repeal a patent application made by German researcher Oliver Brüstle. The European court is expected to make a ruling "in a couple of months".

In my former post, I analysed the proposal of ECJ judge Bot in quite negative terms – concluding it to be a covert attempt to smuggle into European case law legally unsupported and controversial views on the moral status of embryos. However, I also stressed that the many faults of that proposal did not imply that the idea of patenting embryonic stem cell lines is a very good one. To get to the reasons why that is so, I'll now have a look at the response to Bot's proposal from the embryonic stem cell research crowd.

April 27, BBC reported that leading European researchers in the embryonic stem cell field have protested against judge Bot's proposal in a letter to Nature. According to this report, the researchers make three arguments against the proposal – two of a pragmatic nature, and one factual. The pragmatic arguments are that a patent ban on the basis suggested by the judge would imply a disparaging moral message about embryonic stem cell researchers and their activities, and that the ban would undercut investor interest in research on stem cell based therapies, which is now entering the stage of clinical trials. I'll get back to these arguments in a moment.

 The factual argument is that, contrary to what the judge seems to assume, therapeutic procedures involving the use of embryonic stem cell lines would in fact not imply any "industrial use of human embryos". This since the lines are already in existence and that, therefore, all that is needed for the continued use of them is the proliferation of the cell lines themselves. For sure, once upon a time, a number of embryos were destroyed to create these lines, but once that was done any further destruction of embryos is unnecessary. Now, while this argument seems to be sound and valid as regard the particular patent application of Brüstle, it is limited as a response to the principled claims made by judge Bot in his proposal. What the factual argument implies is that this proposal may not apply to Brüstle's application and possible other applications for about 100 cell lines already in existence. However, if the proposal was to pass the ECJ, it would seem to apply to all future attempts to secure patent protection in conjunction with the launching of attempts to produce new embryonic stem cell lines. That is, the factual argument may perhaps get Brüstle and a number of other potential patent applicants in the stem cell field off the hook, but it would allow judge Bot's main idea that producing stem cell lines through the destruction of embryos equals the exploitation of mass murder for organ trafficking purposes to pass into European case law. So, let's move over to the two pragmatic arguments.

Both these arguments seem to me rather weak as they stand. First, if the judge were right about the moral status of embryos according to European law (which he is not, see part 1, but that is not argued by the researchers), sending a disparaging moral message about embryonic stem cell researchers would not seem misplaced. In other words, this argument presumes an argument to the effect that Bot's claim regarding the moral and legal status of embryos is mistaken, but no such argument is given by the researchers.

Second, it is highly debatable if it is actually true that patenting of stem cell lines is either a necessary or a sufficient form of commercial protection for private investors to be attracted to funding the development of stem cell based therapies. What these investors need are patents guaranteeing the exclusive commercial rights to the product ensuing from such research and development, that seems to be true. However, while patenting of cell lines might provide such protection in some cases, they need not do so in all cases – it all comes down to what the product turns out to be. If the product involves using said cell lines, there will be protection. However, the product may also turn out to be a procedure not involving the use of any cells at all (rather, these cells have been a research tool for discovering mechanisms which the product – e.g. a drug – is able to manipulate). More important, even when the product in fact would involve using the cell line in question, the cell line is not identical to the product – the product is the entire procedure in which the cell line is used. In other words, what is necessary is to patent that procedure (insofar as it meets the criteria for European patent protection). This, however, is compatible with having the cell lines themselves unprotected, and thus freely available for use by others for other purposes, such as important basic research.

This brings me to why I actually strongly oppose the idea of allowing patents for all stem cell lines – be it embryonic or adult. First, stem cells are not inventions, they are naturally occurring phenomena – just as (non-synthetic) genes are. The mere fact that the cells have been moved from their original location inside an embryo or the body of an adult doesn't change that. If I move a flower found in the forest into my garden, the flower has not thereby been transformed into a human invention. I may claim, of course, that my garden or the entire flowerbed is my invention – but that does not imply anything about the flower itself. Likewise, if I happen to have developed a unique method for moving the flower, that method is my invention, but the flower is not, wherever it happens to be located as a result of using the method. So, once again, in analogy, while it makes sense to allow patents for various procedures involving stem cells, or whereby stem cells may be transformed into useful products, this does not imply that the patenting of the cells themselves is warranted.

In addition, as we have seen, whatever procedures that may be coming out of stem cell research, it can have its (pragmatically) necessary commercial protection without having any cells or cell-lines patented (unless, of course, all processes are already in the public domain). In fact, granting patents for cells or cell-lines would, in fact, be a disservice both to society and to medical research. Just as we have seen so many nasty examples of in the case of patent on genes in the US, awarding commercial exclusivity rights with regard to "stuff" rather than processes and procedures leads to the result where research and innovation is halted rather than stimulated. The only benefit of such patents befall those individual parties owning the patent and while it may be understandable that, as a friend of mine put it, potential landowners endorse the idea that they may bar parts of the commons for their own private enjoyment, it is hard to see why society should allow – let alone assist – them in realising that ambition.

This brings me to my final point, which is connected to the fact that the ones that seem most enthusiastic about the idea of patenting cells and cell-lines are themselves belonging to a group – representing a field – that I just claimed have the most to loose from having such patents granted. It is actually rather strange to have esteemed scientists and research institutions cheering at the notion of making (a) medical research more difficult and expensive, and (b) thus less likely to produce new breakthroughs (using the resource of stem cells and cell lines). Perhaps they have been blinded by the false idea that cell or cell-line patents are a necessary evil if innovative therapies are to ensue? Or is it perhaps, that they happen to be sitting on some of these precious cell-lines and have let the prospect of making a buck shield their mission as scientists? The gene patent morass in the US has for sure exposed enough of the latter, but there is still time for the European stem cell science community to demonstrate that they are, in fact, better in that respect.

Bad Arguments on All Sides in the European Embryonic Stem Cell Legal Patenting Circus, part 1

I have been commenting generously on what I see as the most profound folly of the legal debates and proceedings concerning (a) embryonic stem cell research (here, here, here, here) and (b) patenting of genes and similar things (here, here, here) in the USA. Might be that I have thus come off as a rather smug European and maybe I was – in any case, here's an apparent redeemer for that. I will do this piece in two parts, starting with the chronological beginning of the story.

In March, Nature News reported, a judge at the European Court of Justice (the decisions of which are binding for all EU member countries) named Bot (forename unknown) brought forth the proposal that patenting embryonic stem cell lines would be unlawful, since they have been produced through a process involving the destruction of embryos. Thus, the judge argued, (as reported by Nature News) "they are tantamount to making industrial use of human embryos", which (quoting the judge) would be contrary to "ordre public and morality". The proposal follows a motion made by Greenpeace to repeal a patent application made by German researcher Oliver Brüstle. The European court is expected to make a ruling "in a couple of months".

I read through the proposal of the judge today (you can download it via the link above) and was actually stunned by its content. Seldom have I seen such an ill-conceived, poorly researched and structured chain of reasoning (I'll soon explain why) provided by an esteemed legal official and expert. And, as if that wasn't enough, it turns out that the foundation of the whole argument is – hold your breath! – an analogy between producing pluripotent stem cells through embryo research and the mass murder that took place in former Yugoslavia, where some victims were harvested for organs intended for transplantation. In spite of being a basic (as in unsupported) premise of the argument, the reasoning revealing this assumption is made very late in the text, just before the judge goes on to summarise his conclusions.

So what, you may wonder, is the judge doing in all those pages before that? Well, actually, mostly irrelevance (a totally misplaced and longwinded discussion about how totipotent cells compare legally to embryos ending with the judge concluding that it has no bearing on the matter at hand) and smashing in doors that have been wide open for at least two decades while holding himself out as some sort of intellectual pioneer; such as "proving" that the term human embryo signifies all stages of the human organism from conception (or the completion of a nuclear transfer – so-called therapeutic cloning) until the implantation is completed. The purpose of these exercises in futility seem to be to "prove" that the production of pluripotent embryonic stem cells involves the destruction of human embryos. Surprise!

So, how does the argument proceed from that stage? To answer this question, we need to backtrack a bit to the many places in the just related discussion where the judge underscores that he will not make any claim on morality that deviates from any law or received public opinion of any of the EU member states. The judge ponders whether the strategy of his argument should....

....be that we ask in what respect the precursor of life deserves less protection than that in which it will naturally result?
82.    Put in this way, the question would then refer to a solution directly inspired by philosophical or religious considerations and would therefore seem impossible to formulate in a way which is acceptable to everyone.
83.    This will not be my approach.

This he must say, since this is how the European legislation regarding embryos is constructed – e.g. in the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights in Biomedicine: While stating that the human being in all its stages is to be legally protected, it leaves open to member states to legislate on the nature and extent of that legal protection. And since said legislation indeed varies from the very conservative to the very liberal as regards embryo research, the judge rightly draws the conclusion that a valid legal argument on the European level cannot be based on any assumption regarding the legal or moral standing of the human embryo.

So, then what is his basis? This, it turns out, is a clause in European patent law (present in most if not all such laws worldwide) stating that a patent application that otherwise meets all requirements can be denied on the ground that it regards something that is contrary to "ordre public and morality". In layman's tongue: popularly well-established and widely shared custom or moral views. But, of course, it is now that trouble begins for real – for what well-established and widely shared European customs or moral views might he invoke in the case of patenting embryonic stem cell lines? It is at this stage that the judge starts a chant about the wide European consensus on the absolute moral horror of the mentioned events in former Yugoslavia that – to much surprise – is directly turned into a conclusion about embryos:

104. The pluripotent stem cell in the present case is removed from the blastocyst which, as I have previously defined, itself constitutes an embryo, that is to say one of the stages in the formation and development of the human body which the removal will destroy.
105. The argument put forward to the Court at the hearing, that the problem of patentability which hinges on the removed cell, the way in which it has been removed and the consequences of such removal do not have to be taken into account seems unacceptable, in my view, for reasons connected with ordre public and morality. A simple example will illustrate my remarks.
106. The current judicial activity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia shows us, obviously subject to the presumption of innocence, that in the course of those events prisoners were killed in order to remove organs for trafficking. If, rather than trafficking, there were experiments which resulted in ‘inventions’ within the meaning of the term in patent law, would they have had to have been recognised as patentable on the ground that the way in which they were obtained was outside the scope of the technical claim in the patent?
107. Such blinkered thinking cannot result in a solution acceptable to the greatest number.
108. Consequently, even though the claims under the patent did not specify that human embryos are used for the exploitation of the invention, when they actually are, the patentability of such an invention must be excluded.

 In other words, the whole argument can be summarised as follows:


1. A European patent application must be denied if it concerns something in opposition to popularly well-established and widely shared custom or moral views throughout Europe.
2. To approve patent for a procedure that involves or presumes actions similar to the killing of prisoners in former Yugoslavia for the purpose of organ trafficking would be in opposition to popularly well-established and widely shared custom or moral views throughout Europe.
3. The removal of pluripotent cells from embryos involves the destruction of said embryos, and thus of human bodies.
4. THEREFORE: The removal of pluripotent cells from embryos involves an action that is in opposition to popularly well-established and widely shared custom or moral views throughout Europe.

But of course, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Here is the missing premise needed for such an outcome:

The destruction of the human bodies of embryos is morally similar to the killing of prisoners in former Yugoslavia for the purpose of organ trafficking according to popularly well-established and widely shared custom or moral views throughout Europe.

However, this claim is false, so even if the premise was to be included in the argument, this argument would be unsound. What is more, the judge cannot include this premise on pains of violating his own earlier statement that his argument will not be based on any particular view of the moral status of embryos not shared throughout Europe. Even worse (for the judge), would he to drop that constraint on his own argument and simply make the claim that the destruction of human bodies in the form of embryos is morally similar to the killing of prisoners in former Yugoslavia for the purpose of organ trafficking, he would make a claim that is invalid in European law, since it assumes a particular view of the moral importance of embryos (they are as important as adult human beings) that member states enjoy the right to deny in their own legislation.

So, in conclusion, behind the carefully constructed smokescreen of page after page of trivialities and irrelevancies, the argument made is a textbook of elementary logical, legal professional and scholarly errors. In totality, though, it is even worse: it is a judge that gives the impression of trying to smuggle into European case law the statement that destroying embryos in research or for medical purposes is morally on a par with murdering adult human beings for the purpose of organ trafficking. And this while he is fully aware that this statement contradicts current European law, since he willingly acknowledges the difference between member states as to embryo and stem cell research legislation. The only alternative explanation I can see is that this judge is extremely bad at his job.

In either case, the esteemed position of the judge as Advocate General at the European Court of Justice is less than well deserved. None of this, however, means that I am in favor of the idea of patenting human embryonic stem cell lines. On the contrary – and in part 2, I will present my case for that view through a critical scrutiny of the reactions of stem cell researchers to the judge's proposal.

Meanwhile, in the real world.....

Today, the second U.S. clinical trial for embryonic stem cell based treatments received clearance from the FDA.

But wait! Wasn't this with embryonic stem cell research banned in the U.S.?? Or wasn't it at least highly contested at the most important legal and political levels? Well.......

More on the US Embryonic Stem Cell Research Policy Turn-around

Having just finished replying to a comment to my blog post yesterday on this topic, the news reached me that the US Department of Justice intends to appeal the injunction of Judge Lamberth. Today, the day after, renowned US bioethics scholar Art Caplan reacts with admirably restrained rage in a comment that fiercely attacks the argument made by Judge Lamberth, as well as giving some additional insight into what sort of gatherings, forces and petty interests are behind the suits leading up to yesterday's ruling.

So my guess was right, we have only seen the first moves in what will presumably be a long legal dance. A dance, I have claimed, that is built on hypocricy and outright foolishness - as so often when dogmatism meets real life.

US Stem Cell Legal Debacle the First Step In a Long Fight Based on Absurdity and Stupidity

Today The New York Times reported that US president Barack Obama's about one and a half year old turnaround of US policy on embryonic stem cell research has been halted by Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. Judge Lambert issued a temporary injunction against Obama's policy change that made federally funded research on embryonic stem cell lines legal regardless of when these lines were created. Before the change, federal funding (i.e. NIH grants) could only be granted to projects utilising cell-lines created prior to 9:00 P.M. EDT on August 9, 2001. The judge's argument for the ruling is that President Obama's policy change violates a 14 year old ban on the use of federal money for stem cell research involving the destruction of embryos. The complete ruling can be found here. US stem cell scientists have reacted with shock and the news have quickly waltzed around the world, giving quick and strong echo also in my own country (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, just to name a few), thus illustrating the importance of US policy in this area for scientists and clinicians all over the world, also in countries like my own, that allows stem cell research on the same conditions of ethical review as other types of human subject research.

Judge Lamberth's ruling is the direct result of a suit against Obama's policy change made by the so-called Alliance Defense Fund, a Christian lobbyist and legal activist organisation that describes itself as "defending the right to hear and speak the Truth". One may justifiably rant about the obvious absurdity of this claim in light of the fact that the suit against embryonic stem cell research is an obvious move to stop stem cell scientists to be able to find and speak the truth about stem cells and their role in the human body and impact on human health. However, at the same time, I was not surprised by this attempt from the world (in)famous US "religious right". After all, the basic ethical stance underlying this particular opposition to embryonic stem cell research is that the destruction of human embryos involved in creating the cell lines in question equals first degree murder. In consequence, using the products of such destruction for research equals a deeply immoral exploitation on the occurrence of what people holding this view logically has to regard as mass murder of the same epic proportions as the Holocaust, Stalin's terror and the "year zero" slaughter of Khmer Rouge Cambodia.

On the other side of the hedge, however, are all those people who do not subscribe to this extreme ethical view. Pointing to the enormous potential benefits to life and health of embryonic stem cell research they claim that even if human embryos are not "things" and worth protection (none of these people claim, e.g., that embryonic stem cell research should be unregulated or exempted from the requirement of research ethical review), the research is defensible.

In effect, we may probably look forward to a long legal battle in the US, Judge Lamberth's ruling being but the first step. But in the meantime we may ask about the ethical basis both for the ban on federal funding of embryo research and for Judge lamberth's application of this ban to stem cell research.

I must be honest and declare from the outset that US policy on embryo research has always struck me as part absurd, part plain stupid (no disrespect to US federal politicians intended, the stupidity is structural). This is not because I disagree with the basic ethical view on the moral importance of human embryos described earlier. That is, I do disagree with it, but even if this view is granted as an axiom, one would, I suggest, have to agree that US policy in this area suffers from a complete lack of supporting arguments. Having been involved in the academic ethics debate about embryo research as well as the process of political debate leading to the clear legalisation of embryonic stem cell research in Sweden in the early years of this century, I have had the opportunity to think about this topic once again recently, due to new research on the ethics not of stem cell research but that of regulating stem cell research, undertaken in cooperation with Daniela Cutas, and very recently published in the book Contested Cells - Global Perspectives on the Stem Cell Debate.

So let's start with the absurdity. The idea of the destruction of human embryos being murder, and the systematic such destruction thus being a case of genocide, does not directly imply that it is immoral to use cell lines resulting from such destruction for research or other purposes. For instance, even today, hospitals and doctors all over the world are making use of the results of the Nazi freezing experiments without any representative of the US religious right raising his voice in protest. However, we may also compare to how anyone of us would react if we learned that the hospitals of our country were making use of tissue and organs for transplantation that had been produced by the elaborate murder of people in other countries in order to obtain these organs and tissue. It is, I believe, in this vein that the opposition to embryonic stem cell research has to be understood - again, assuming for the sake of discussion the basic premise regarding the moral importance of embryos. Now, what is the logical conclusion of such a piece of reasoning? Well, I conjecture, it is certainly not that the sort of policy we find in the US is justified.

Consider the Bush policy of banning the funding of research on cell lines produced after August 9, 2001. As I understand it, the result of the ADF suit and Judge Lamberth's subsequent ruling is that this is the policy that is now in effect until further legal notice. However, this policy is not supported by the ethical argument just set out. This argument makes no difference between the destruction of embryos or the use of the cell lines thus produced on the basis of when this destruction and production took place. Murder remains murder even if it occurred before August 9, 2001, and what is, in virtue of the reasoning explained above, an immoral exploitation on the occurrence of murder remains so whenever the murder is supposed to have taken place. In fact, Dr. Cutas and myself conclude, in the chapter mentioned above, the only way to square the Bush policy with the view on the moral importance of embryos entertained by its supporters would be to revise the latter so that strong moral importance is attached only to embryos that exist after August 9, 2001. The absurdity of this sort of standpoint should be obvious even to the most nutty "pro-lifer". That is, had Judge Lamberth been consistent in his ruling, he would have invalidated not only Obama's but also Bush's policy on embryonic stem cell research. His current ruling is, in effect, genuinely paradoxical.

So, over to stupidity. This point regards not only US policy on stem cell research, but its entire legal take on all sorts of embryo research. Again, I'm assuming for the sake of discussion, the validity of the view on the moral importance of embryos already mentioned. Morally speaking, embryo research is in effect genocide. If true, this is excellent reasons indeed to ban embryo research, isn't it?! Indeed it is, however, US policy is not about banning embryo research. You may destroy human embryos by doing research or any other thing, as long as you are not funding your activities through federal taxes. Genocide is OK if you pay for it yourself!! In fact, it is well known among scholars studying the ethical, legal and social implications of genetics and reproductive technology that the chief effect of the US ban on federal funding of embryo research is that all activities where embryos are destroyed are now safely out of reach of any sort of regulation within the confines of the commercial secrecy of corporations and private enterprises. In consequence, embryos are being destroyed at least as much as ever, but due to the ban even farther off from the reach of the long arm of the law than before. This is simply stupid. Especially people who view embryo research as genocide should think so - on this basis, the conclusion has to be that the ban makes a bad thing even worse. And to get away from this stupidity, the only way would seem to lead back to absurdity; claiming that embryo destruction is not murder as long as US federal tax payers don't pay for it. Again, even the nuttiest of pro-lifer should recognise the absurdity of such a claim, and thus oppose and fight the ban regarding embryo research.