What Is A Terrorist Threat, And How Should One Respond To It?

The other day, following the recent horrid events in Paris, linked to several temporally closely aligned similar attacks by Daesh, e.g., in Lebanon and Iraq, apparent intelligence on several other planned attacks throughout Europe, and specifically that a possible Daesh operative had entered Sweden to organise a large.scale attack of some sort, my country raised its official terrorist threat level from 3 to 4 on a scale that ends at 5. One named suspect of preparation of terrorist crime has now been apprehended, but the police and security organs apparently continue to search for others, and the government has been clear that this single factor will not by itself motivate downgrading the threat level. At the same time, several voices criticise the development either for coming much too late (claiming, among other things, that the knowledge of the presence of Daesh sympathisers in the country should have been enough), or for being misdirected, as actual terror attacks in Sweden (save one) tend mostly to be domestic extreme right wing nationalist/racist (targetting refugees and street begging EU migrants, people of visibly Muslim or Roma identity or Middle East or African descent, their living quarters, and so on), or is exaggerated and bound to create more problems than what it prevents or fixes. It struck me that many of these reactions seem based on ignoring or fixing on only selected aspects of what is technically known as a risk analysis. For this is basically what the assessment of the level of terrorist threat by a state is about: assessing certain risks and cost of events classified as terrorist attacks, as well as various actions possibly to take in response to various such levels of risk, and to evaluate on that basis what to do.

A disclaimer before I start: the putative facts about the seriousness of typical types of terrorist attacks, and the likelihood of different types of such attacks, are, of course, open to revision in the face of facts – although, as will become clear, less obviously according to what standard of evidence. All of the aspects described are part of the discussion of the ethical basis of environmental and technological risk policy that I undertake in my book The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk.

First, there is the two main dimensions of the concept of risk itself: the probability and harm dimensions. A risk is always the possible (and to some extent likely) occurrence of some type of variably harmful event. In risk analysis, the magnitude of a risk is determined by a combination of these two dimensions, so that a low probability may be balanced by a serious harm-level, and the other way around. Already this simple analytical unpacking points to a factor that may seem to be at work in the reaction to the raised Swedish terror threat level. Some people focus mainly on the likelihood dimension, and then would hesitate to criticise that new evidence and circumstances changes the assessment, or would rather have seen an earlier raised level in view of the actual wave terror attacks in the form of typical "lone wolf" deeds, and thus a concentration on extreme right wing violence rather than its Islamistic sibbling. Others focus instead on the harm dimension, and then lets the demonstrated vastness of the damage of attacks such as the one in Paris dictate the risk assessment, also when the evidence of likelihood is very weak. This may then motivate the position that, knowing that Daesh and similar groups do have had attacks such as the one  in Paris on its theoretical agenda for a long time (and carried out i the Iraq and Syrian theaters). With the notable exception of Anders Behring Breivik, although much more frequent and actually realised rather than merely theoretically imagined, the right-wing extremist deeds, while clearly terrorism in the sense of attempting to spread fear for political purposes through the use of violence against civilians, tend to be more restricted in its consequences than the large scale massacres that have now occurred and known to be on the Daesh agenda.

Second, there is the way in which different such combinations and magnitudes of risk are evaluated, or seen to support various courses of action. Here, a number of additional issues linked to the assessment of the risk magnitude is actualised, namely:

Third, how the constituents of the risk (its probability level and its harm level) are evaluated in terms of how much we should care about it. This gives another way in which we may get a similar output that was just described above, even if all agree of the risk magnitude. This since risks with the same magnitude may still be evaluated differently, e.g. due to being made up of very low probability, or very serious potential harm. here, one may also want to pay attention to the context, such as if one is making the assessment from the position of already being burdened by much risk of different kind. So if the potentially worst terror threat are the least likely, and the most likely ones the least serious (relatively speaking, of course), we may again get differences of opinion of a similar sort, but now more clearly based on differences of values rather than appraisal of fact.

Fourth, how the opportunity costs of different actions in response to a risk assessment are evaluated, that is, what is lost and risked by taking these various actions rather than other ones. Here we may spot a number of ways in which assessments may differ, although not basically disagreeing on the risk assessment (such disagreements may, of course, also be added to other disagreements). For instance, several argued against extensive action in face of the wave of apparently extreme right wing nationalist attacks against Swedish actual or in preparation asylum shelters that it would not be worth the costs it would mean to have effective guarding of each one of them. At the same time, there has been no or very little hesitance to mobilise extensive police and security forces to guard potential targets and just demonstrate the presence of the state organs to effect public calm in the wake of the new threat level. But there has been some criticism, for instance, from one of the country's most prominent terrorist experts, Magnus Norell, who claimed that even if there is a raised threat, the actions in response to it and the very act of public threat level raising itself mostly creates unnecessary worry and fear, that is the very effect aimed for by terrorists. One may also wonder how effective the guarding by police of places like train stations and main squares of large cities are, provided that combatants such as those responsible for the Beirut and Paris attacks are set on targeting them. In both cases, this would also mean that these resources are, in fact, wasted. In that light, posting armed guards outside every asylum shelter to guard against a wholly different kind of terrorists targeting these may suddenly seem as a more effective and less costly measure. This aspect, of course, has many more sides, but this only goes to show how the evaluation of options in response to a described threat, and the opportunity costs attached to them may be used to inject the issue with limitless complexity.

Fifth, there is the issue of the evaluation of evidence, underlying the probability estimates at work in all of the considerations pointed to above Here, we may see a number of differences on what type of evidence is to be given the most credence: Actual similar past events is one model, following the "frequentist" ideal in decision theory. That would, in the present case, probably speak in favour of a much higher probability for more extreme nationalist right wing terrorism against refugees, migrants and their quarters in Sweden, as this is what wa have mostly had in the past (especially the very close past). Another model is to instead trust qualified estimates, by appointed experts, who may then, if they so prefer, let other reasons than frequentist ones affect the probability estimate. For instance, even if there has been no, or relatively very few, attacks of the type known to be on the Al-Qaeda and Daesh agendas, the fact there are such attacks on this agenda combined with the presence of people who sympathise with these movements in the country, and maybe witness statements that some such person in the country has been mentioned to plan or want to plan such an attack, may be used as evidence. Some of that evidence may be broken down into an indirect frequentist argument, as it points to factors believed to have been active in relevantly similar past events elsewhere. But a substantial portion would also seem to be about subscribing to certain qualitative and evaluative assessments, such as choosing to trust certain bearers for information as credible, viewing certain events as relevantly similar in spite of notable dissimilarities, and so on. The point is that the more of this latter sort of probability grounding is used, the more room to assess as probable also events of which there have been no very similar precedent.

Sixth, there is the issue of the how much evidence (given some standard of its quality of the sort just described) should be required for a credible estimate, and for taking action. This factor is basically about how long we should wait and amass evidence to have a more well-founded risk assessment, in view of the potential costs of being to late to act effectively against the threat (if there is any). Also this aspect seems to be at work in the Swedish debate, as those who complain about the threat level not having been raised and associated action taken earlier seem to be prone to care less about the evidence of the threat, and rather have action on looser grounds to be "better safe than sorry", but the of course also downgrade or ignore the opportunity costs of this. Those who require more evidence will, on the other hand, want to wait longer even in the face of potential dangers such as the present ones, and some of these might be content with the balance made by Swedish authorities, while others would find the actions premature and would prefer more evidence to assess the raised level and the linked actions justified.

The idea that, inside this vastly variable complex of factors and possible positions on how to do a risk analysis and act on its results there exists one, simple and self-evident alternative is, of course, utterly ridiculous.

***

The Limits of Self-defense, the Threat of Violent Right-wing Extremism and the Job of Leviathan

One night, I'm being attacked in my home by a right wing extremist neighbour, who doesn't like the anti-racism slogan on my door. He catches me by surprise when I come home from this evening's grocery shopping and, armed with a stick and bottle, he forces himself into my hall as I unlock and open my door. Inside, he starts to push me further in, yelling violent threats and hitting me. But I manage to regain the initiative, because a friend of mine is sitting in my living room, waiting for me to return, for us to prepare some dinner together, and when she joins me, we outnumber the extremist attacker and counter the violence wielded against us, using whatever weapons we can grab. Yelling back and now making a threatening figure, we make him turn around and back out of the door, we continue out of the flat, into the outer hallway of the house, following him back down the stairs to make sure he exits the house. When we open the front door, we can see the attacker disappear surrounded by some police, who have now arrived, one of which meet us right outside my house and asks us to stop our pursuit. But I'm doubting the capacity of the police – after all, where were they when that madman attacked me in the first place? And I'm angry and scared and full of violent energy – that /%€#*! I so want a bite at him, don't I? Plus, I feel I have the right on my side, since I was attacked because of my political opinions, which I have all right to hold and to communicate publicly. I also hold a knife in my hand, which I grabbed in the moments earlier as a last resort, fearing the attacker who was armed. So, I ignore the policeman's instruction and start running after the attacker, catching him fleeing before any of the cops have managed to get at him, and I stab him in the back. Deep. Several times. He sinks to the ground, blood flooding, and I realise he might die. But I feel safe now. Ten seconds later I'm arrested by the police and eventually convicted for attempted manslaughter (as the attacker survived), wielding of an unlawful weapon and insubordination of a police officer. I get six years and seven months in jail. The prosecutor has been lenient and charged me with attempted m.s. rather than murder in spite of me having confessed awareness of the risk of my violence being deadly, taking account of the earlier threat against me. But the sentence is at the same time influenced by the fact that I have convictions from before – for attacking the homes of known right-wing extremists using weapons and rioting, among other things, so that counts against me sentencing-wise. Had I been younger – I'm 35 – and had had a clean record, the sentence might have been less harsh, but under the circumstances it is expected.

This is a made-up story, but it recounts in a more domestic setting and with some dramatic addition of a subjective nature, the events occurring at a political anti-racism demonstration in the Stockholm suburb Kärrtorp a few months back. An armed neonazi extremist gang attacked a peaceful anti-racism manifestation, organised by ordinary people living in the area. The people, however, drove the attackers back, using a bit of force, as they had every right to. But, having driven the attackers away, it didn't stop, a few present self-appointed "anti fascist activists" started a further pursuit of them, in spite of being ordered by the initially inorganised, surprised and outnumbered police to stay where they were. One of these activists caught up with one of the attackers and stabbed him several times in the back, causing severe inner damage, almost killing him. This person was today convicted for attempted manslaughter, unlawful threat (a charge from a separate event), carrying an unlawful weapon and violent rioting to 6 years and 7 months in prison. The reports of this are found here (in this segment the knifing is identified in a video), here, here. Seven of the neonazi attackers have already been convicted for violent rioting to varying sentences, several of them young enough to be handed over to social services for compulsory non-penal measures. The man convicted today is 35 years, already has a series earlier convictions, involving threat and violence, and is a member of the left-wing activist group, the "Revolutionary Front", whose members have recently been forced to leave the reformist left-wing party, Vänsterpartiet. In light of all these things, the sentence looks quite normal and expected, in particular if one counts that there's already been a deduction in the seriousness of the initial charge.

Videos of the events in Kärrtorp are here (the initial phase, in the latter part the knifing is caught on film, as analysed in the first news report linked to above)...



And here (the latter phase, when the attackers where further pursued out into the woods)



Many people, not least with left-wing leaning political sympathies, and especially those engaged in anti-racism have a problem accepting this outcome of things. They feel that it is the neonazi attackers who are to blame. Or that it is the police's fault, which should have been expecting trouble and been more prepared. But this reasoning is very hard to make into sense. Look at the the first made-up story. I think everybody agree that I and my friend had every right to do what we did up to the point when the policeman ordered us to stop the pursuit. True, i didn't feel safe in the story and I didn't trust the police (plus I was angry as hell), but that gives me no right to pursue a fleeing person to stab him in the back. Do you feel inclined to disagree? Change the story just one bit and give me my hunting rifle with a scope, shooting the attacker down from several hundred meters. That ok too? Now hand me my machine gun and the grenades....

But what about the police, shouldn't they have been better prepared? Indeed they should have in the best of worlds and from now on, they really should. The threat from right-wing extremist activists towards ordinary people expressing decent and ordinary opinions peacefully is very reall. We are all threatened by this group of criminals. But the fact that the police wasn't sufficiently prepared in Kärrtorp does not give people a license to kill anymore than the fact that the police wasn't there in sufficient force to make me feel safe in my first example. You're still doubtful? Let's generalize the reasoning you feel drawn to and ask what sort of society you would get....

This is the principle that applies to everyone of us: Whenever I feel insufficiently safe, I may use deadly force against other people who I, for good reason, feel threatened by. Now, imagine for a while, how the streets of a normal city would be like if that logic was allowed to prevail. That, my dear friend, is society breaking apart into the shards that we have a state in the first place to secure us against. This was famously realised by the British political philosopher Thomas Hobbes several hundred years back, in chapters 13-15 of his legendary treatise Leviathan. And to make sure that such protection remains, the sovereign power of the state is licensed to use whatever force necessary - to prevent a return of that state of nature where life of everyone is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". For that reason, to have common rules embraced that ensure that as little such state force is necessary makes a lot of sense. But that, in turn, makes it necessary for the sovereign – the state – to provide reasonable protection from what otherwise awaits us. For it is the well-known tactic of right-wing extremists – all since the successful use of the S.A. "militia" by the Nazi party in Weimar Germany in the 1930's to create a wide sense of disorder and panic, which useful idiot revolutionary left-wing groups at the time let themselves be drawn into – to lure us into abandoning our shared societal rules, in order for them to start to look like a pleasant alternative of firm order to have the trains run on time once more.

In effect, the reaction that the police needs to be better at protecting people against the violent threat of right-wing extremists makes a lot of sense. And perhaps, there is even reason to ponder a less generous freedom of association, assembly and expression (which in Sweden is much more allowing that, e.g. in Germany, when it comes to the first two). But, once again, that doesn't give us all a license to kill. Rather, the logic is like this: society has a good reason to tighten its response and protection against the apparently increased threat of violent attacks against ordinary people. And it has this reason not only because of its general duty to provide a peaceful and secure society, it has it also to forestall any undermining of the public general support of common rules according to which deadly force is not to be wielded except under conditions of extreme necessity for self-defense or defense of others. If we tread over that border, the response should be as harsh as ever else in similar circumstances, for what we engage in is not self-defense or a noble fight for a more peaceful society, it is the gradual dismantling of civilization at its core.