The Paris, COP 21, Climate Change Policy Deal

The news's just flowing out of Paris that a global deal on climate change policy has been struck. The draft agreement (as it is called), can be found here. As so many agreements at this level it is virtually unreadable for a lay person, and the first 19 pages are only about the background, earlier deals and formal stuff about adoption, how to sign up, etc.

The real stuff – the actual deal – starts in the so-called Annex, on page 20, and on page 21, in article 2, we find the nitty-gritty:

Article 2

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: 

(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;

(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. 

2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

The rest is detail. Not unimportant, as it stresses, e.g., the strong responsibility of rich countries to present the main bankrolling regarding mitigation, adaption, compensation,  technology transfer, etc. But article 2 is what sets the level of political ambition: the point of all the rest. The fact that the agreement has now clearly stood against all attempts to abandon the 2°C target for a higher one, has now been not only been scrapped, but reversed to aim for a lower level is very good news for anyone who has inspected the dire global consequences in all areas of life and society of already a 2°C rise of the global temperature.

Could Reproductive Liberty be Ethically Curtailed for Environmental Policy Reasons? or Why I Would Have Rejected Cristina Richie's Article on IVF

It's been a bit of a gale (as opposed to a bona fide storm) lately, following an article in the Journal of Medical Ethics by Cristina Richie, entitled "What would an environmentally sustainable reproductive technology industry look like?". It's not the question of a full hurricane, as in the infamous "after birth abortion" paper from 2012, but this rather raving rant is on the more aggressive end of the scale of reactions to Richie's piece. I dislike the language and the attitude expressed at the end of this article for simple reasons of decency and respect, but I also rather dislike Richie's article for more intellectual reasons. In fact, having read it, I have come to the conclusion that, had I been the JME reviewer for it, I would have recommended rejection.

Based on the undisputed fact that human reproduction carries with it a carbon footprint (assuming fixed per capita consumption levels related to population-size and -growth), Richie's paper argues about assisted reproductive technologies (ART), such as IVF, that...

The use of ART to produce more human-consumers in a time of climate change needs to be addressed.  Policymakers should ask carbon-emitting countries to change their habits to align with conservation. And though all areas of life – from transportation, to food, to planned technological obsolescence – must be analysed for ecological impact, the offerings of the medical industry, especially reproductive technologies, must be considered as well.

More specifically, she argues that access to ART should be restricted to "those who are not biologically infertile", meaning thereby to exclude, e.g., homosexual couples, single individuals and other "rainbow" family constellations. In particular, she claims, such restriction should befall publicly funded medical services of this kind. To season the stew somewhat, Richie is openly declared as belonging to "catholic theorlogical ethics", attached to an openly Catholic academic institution, the theology department of Boston College, a church well-known for its officially set hostile stance towards both ART in general and, in particular, technological facilitation of human reproduction in other social forms than within that of a married heterosexual couple.

Iain Brassington at the JME's blog has opposed the idea that Richie therefore should have declared a conflict of interest. He does however concur with several critics, some described here, that the attempted distinction between "biological" and other types of infertility is swampy territory. In fact, all infertility is always partly social, as it depends on a person or a group of persons being unsatisfied by existing alternatives to using ART, such as keep on trying the old "natural" way, attempt to adopt, or remain childless. A particularly tricky thing is that many times, individuals belonging to the group that Richie would presumably call "biologically" infertile, their infertility may very well be due to the fact that they prefer to keep to their couple relationship. Already here, had I been a reviewer of the paper, I would have unconditionally demanded revision. This is sloppy conceptual work of a sort a philosophy teacher slams A-level students for and it is given the job of providing substance to one of the article's main theses. I'm frankly surprised that reviewers and editors of a leading bioethics journal could let that one pass.

At the same time, Brassington insists in another comment that the general idea, which is the other thesis of the article, of subjecting human reproductive liberty and policies to the challenge of their impact on pressing environmental problems is not necessarily ill-conceived. Again, I agree, as I should do, having argued some 18 years back (an open access preprint is here) that global justice and health concerns may be reasons for people to avoid having children and rather adopt or otherwise assist existing children in need. As I argued in that context, however, Brassington observes that there seems to be no reason to restrict the environmental argument to the use of ART, but rather that if the argument bites, it points towards more general conclusions about the value of avoiding human procreation, e.g. via adoption or policies like the infamous Chinese 1-child restriction or other types of limitations.

Another comment that expands this particular line of criticism has emerged from Dominic Wilkinson, also on the JME blog, where he argues that Richie's argument is flawed to the core, due to its claim that ARTs are in some way extra environmentally problematic. Now, Richie herself does openly confess that this may very well not be so, but that she nevertheless chooses to restrict her paper to a thesis pertaining to ART. In other words, the main thesis of the article is entirely dependent on an ad hoc and arbitrary restriction of its thematic scope. Richie presents no argument justifying this restriction, but her article nevertheless is left to pursue a main claim pertaining to ART and only ART. This, given the level of ethical controversy around ARTs, is unjustified bias. Had Richie presented an argument in favour of the limitation of the scope it hadn't been so, but since she in fact claim herself that there's nothing special with ARTs, the article is clearly skewed in an unwarranted way. Therefore, had I been reviewer, I would have faulted the article on that ground, demanding a more general discussion of reproductive liberty in the face of environmental policy – alternatively, independent arguments for singling out ARTs as a specific target. This is a major flaw that the review or editorial process should have caught.

Together these two problems with the article point to a third one, namely that it aims to prove two intellectually independent main claims. This is asking for trouble, as everyone knows, but it is obvious why Richie wants to take the risk: without the combination, she wouldn't have been able to aim her shot specifically at the application of ART for the facilitation of reproduction within "alternative" families. Thus, Richie has an apparent (possibly religiously motivated) agenda to place a questioning of ART and specific applications of ART in a well-regarded scientific journal. Even if that doesn't amount to a conflict of interest, it undercuts the claim to intellectual honesty one would require of a researcher worthy of publication in the JME. Again, I'm surprised that this wasn't picked up in the JME review or editorial process.

Having said that, the general ethical issues arising out of the link between human reproduction and environmental concerns (of all kinds), are sure worthy of more reflection. In fact, this is something that I will be addressing with qualified colleagues at a panel convened by myself on Reproductive Public Health Ethics at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory in just a few weeks.

USA Willingness to Abandon 2°C Target in Climate Talks Opens for Negative Spirals and Moral Criticism

Just the other day, the US government went public with an official willingness to abandon the henceforth solidly agreed 2°C target in global climate policy talks. It did so rather slippery, through a public address by the Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, at Dartmouth College. Not a public declaration by the President, or at least a minister. But nevertheless a clear signal, since it is since some time posted at the US Dept. of State's webpage. 

The declaration of "flexibility" with regard to the 2°C target has been met with criticism. But I wonder why the critics all act so surprised. This, I would claim, is an expected outcome of the way that the COP climate policy summits have been going over the last few years. However, I also think that the "flexibility" is far more deadly than what is implied by the criticism and for this, I have support from some of my own latest research!

Some of you may have noted my yearly comments on the global climate policy talks, the so-called COP, from no. 15, 16 and 17. Since last time in Durban, it was agreed that the COP summit will not meet again until 2015, and since that agreement was a result of the continued refusal of a few powerful players (the US and China in particular) to yield on their position to have others pay for the inescapable burdens of managing the climate change that is already unavoidable and preventing or, at least, limiting further such change by halting the continuing rise of the global mean temperature to one of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. In my last comment, I elaborated on why the 2°C target is such an important cornerstone of the COP talks:

...the 2° target, it must be understood, is not in any way magical or set in stone. In fact, some claims it to be a much too allowing goal. Moreover, the target is rather a range than an exact temperature, since the climate models necessarily embody rather drastic uncertainties. But the 2°C is of importance for two reasons. First, it is one of the very few substantial things about climate policy that the global community has been able to agree on. Second, it approximates the limit of our empirical knowledge from the past and, thus, our basis for prediction, preparation and adaption in face of the various changes that increases of the global mean temperature bring. A bit simplified, beyond 2°C, what we have is basically mathematics and fantasy – something that is amply illustrated by the predictive models in climate change research. Our ability to prepare for whatever will be coming – and thus to be capable of reversing the process without considerable higher cost to human life and well-being – becomes drastically weakened.

Already in Durban, there was a clear tendency that some parties wanted, nevertheless, to abandon the 2°C target, and I warned that the yielding of, especially European countries to the pressures from USA, China and a few other parties with high short-term stakes, to postpone further yearly talks (where this focus on short-term self-interests of these countries were being painfully exposed), lest they would abandon the talks altogether, would further such an end result, since:

...we may expect no, repeat no, preparation on the political home-fronts of these countries for a climate deal in 2015 which implies making actual concessions and taking on actual commitments. This, I claim, is the main result of the strategy of the EU and the rest of the world in Durban.

 Why is this so? Because in the game of Chicken played by the US, China and their unholy group of allies (for the analysis showing that this is what they are doing, see my first COP post)...

...Europe and the rest of the Kyoto-protocol signing countries are allowing themselves to become what game theorists know as money pumps – someone who is applying a strategy that makes one systematically vulnerable to making deals that sum up to a loosing position, while one's counterpart is systematically winning, although each singular deal may look like a winner. Giving in to blackmail (which is, effectively, what Europe is doing in the climate policy negotiation game) is a prime example.

If not clear before, the declared "flexibility" on the 2°C target makes this as evident as one may wish. For the 2°C target is, as a matter of fact even more important than what has been set out above. For what the agreement on the 2°C target stands for is the idea that a climate policy agreement is supposed to limit further rises of the global temperature and, hence, limit the extent and costs (in monetary as well as human and environmental terms) of climate change, by limiting CO2 and other green house gas emissions. It is the global acceptance of that ultimate goal which has then created the necessity of negotiating of how to distribute the, no doubt, substantial costs of reaching it. It is, thus, within this frame that the above mentioned game of Chicken has been played, with the outcome that none of the institutional frameworks created at the COP meetings and mentioned by Todd Stern will have any substantial impact on climate change. Therefore, what Stern argues in his Dartmouth address is that the difficulties of reaching an agreement in such a context means that keeping to the 2°C target will mean that one forfeits one's chance of substantial global political agreement:

For many countries, the core assumption about how to address climate change is that you negotiate a treaty with binding emission targets stringent enough to meet a stipulated global goal – namely, holding the increase in global average temperature to less than 2° centigrade above pre-industrial levels – and that treaty in turn drives national action. This is a kind of unified field theory of solving climate change – get the treaty right; the treaty dictates national action; and the problem gets solved. This is entirely logical. It makes perfect sense on paper. The trouble is it ignores the classic lesson that politics – including international politics – is the art of the possible.

However, while I agree with Stern that the situation that has ensued in global climate policy negotiations is grave, the cure he proposes to my mind threatens to make the patient much more ill than if, simply, Europe and other states pressing for substantial concessions stood up a little bit better. And, as an aside, perhaps this is what Stern senses too, thus continuing the Chicken-playing by saying the things he does, hoping that the other side will thereby look at a hard line for insisting on such concessions as a hopeless strategy.But, nevertheless, if Stern would have his way, what would that imply? Would we then see a chance

In my recent book on the ethical basis of the precautionary principle, The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk (Springer, 2011), I discuss the implications of the theory of the ethics of risk that I develop and defend on the example of climate change policy (chapter 6, section 6.2.1). A primary result of that analysis that is no way dependent on my own particular theory is that there is an intimate interplay between ethically analysing the issues of:

(1) how much of risk and damage due to climate change that may be accepted in view of the costs of preventing or reducing them and available options, and

(2) how the costs of reducing or preventing risk and damage due to climate change should be distributed between concerned parties.

This since, first, the answer to (1) will partly depend on what latitude of acceptable options that is available with regard to (2). The more constrained we are with regard to how the costs of action (and inaction) may be distributed, the less the room for arguing in favor of a lower acceptance level for climate change related risk and damage. This since there will be less practical ways of pulling an actual implementation of such a lower level off without having to distribute costs in unacceptable ways. Second, how (1) is set will dictate, under most minimally reasonable ideas of how (unavoidable) costs and harm should be distributed between parties, what solutions of (2) that become available. When more is at stake, issues about distribution becom more pressing and increasingly minor details (especially regarding already burdened, especially unfavored or otherwise especially vulnerable parties) will become more relevant.

This mutual dependence is mirrored by what seems like a very plausible social scientific assumption with regard to how events may in fact be expected to unfold: The lower the actual acceptance level for climate change related risk and damage is set, the more difficult it will be to reach actual consensus on how to distribute the costs of implementing such a level, and the farther away from consensus with regard to (2) that concerned parties perceive themselves to be, the less likely that they will agree on a lower level with regard to (1). The first is what has already been demonstrated by the COP failures. The second dependence, however, although I predicted it in my book, has so far not been demonstrated. That is, up to Todd Stern's announcement of the new "flexible" US view of the 2°C target. For this is what Stern's (and the USA's) new stand boils down to: allowing more of risk and damage due to climate change in order to have a less difficult situation agreeing to a distribution of the costs of the steps taken to limit the risks and damage of climate change. In straight terms: those that will be harmed by climate change will be harmed more and some that would not have been harmed otherwise will be now be harmed, since the US decides to accept that rather than open its massive purse just a tiny bit more.

In my book, I argue that reasoning in patterns like Stern here does is both morally and rationally indefensible (quite apart from its role in extending the blackmail operation of the Chicken playing henceforth forming the US main strategy), since it tends to create a self-fulfilling prophecy situation. If the US says that the formerly agreed upper limit on green house gas emissions (in terms of a limit to the rise of the mean global temperature) is open for revision upwards, parties will be less prepared to accept that limit (since they can see the opportunity of having to carry less costs for limiting emissions thereby created), and thus the case for the Stern stance is strengthened, since the 2°C target does not (due to his having made the initial statement) enjoy such a strong support after all. We can now see how this process may continue according to a so far unknown logic of development, where eventually the difficulties of agreeing on the distribution of costs will be so easy to overcome so that no significasnt party see any need for pressing for a further upward adjustment of the global emission or mean temperature limit. Will that be 4, a 5, a 6 or perhaps a 7°C limit? We don't know. All we know is that people will reap the harvest in the next few hundred years in terms of much more climate change related damage and and exponentially worse risks.

All of this is exactly why responsible politicians once upon a time made the 2°C agreement – so that something could be kept out of the negotiations, knowing what would otherwise ensue, thus creating a basis for a result that would actually save people from harm to a significant extent. But to do that, global politics needs to finally confront the distribution issue seriously, rather than dancing around it in a ritual of looking the other way that has been the rule of the COP summits. This is what the Stern address teaches us. It needs to disprove Stern's claim that doing that within the framework of a morally responsible resolve to limit the damage of climate change is not within "the art of the possible". In my book, I sketch one contribution to such an endeavor in the form of a way of solving the distribution issue (answering question (2) above) without invoking any of those traditional disagreements over what is just and fair that are currently poisoning and paralyzing global climate policy talks with useless ideology. It is possible, I argue, to infer a solution to the question of how to distribute the costs just by having each party work out what would be the most morally responsible decision for them to make in terms of the risks and chances, harms and benefits and available options. The total result of those solutions of each party will provide a distribution where no one will have a good reason to complain, while at the same time the resulting agreement may actually do some substantial good in terms of prevention and reduction of climate change related damage and risk.

COP-17: Brazil, China, India, South Africa and USA Wearing the Dunce Cap, Europe the Jester's

Some of you may know that this has happened to become a bit of yearly feature – me commenting on the latest climate policy debacle happening as clockwork this time of year. Earlier posts are here and here. Sources for getting to know about the outcome of this year's COP are here, here, here, here, here, here (last three international, more below).

To summarise, the outcome of COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was nothing except that everyone agreed to keep meeting and that having a climate change policy deal capable of stopping the increase of the global mean temperature at 2°C is an important target. In Cancún last year (COP-16), not even that happened, since Bolivia declined to sign on to continued talks. What did happen, though, was a sort of thing that ended up as the main product of this year's talks, namely agreement not on any policy, but on the practical structure of continued talks. In the COP-16 deal, this agreement was restricted to the way of handling the most difficult questions of all, namely the distribution of the costs of climate change policy (emission reductions as well as adaption to inevitable natural changes); which is planned to be dealt with through a special fund.

This year, nothing more about this fund was said (such as how it is going to become filled with money), but a similar empty institutional form has been set up for the entirety of the continued process, planned to lead to an agreement on emission reductions in 3 years. In short, instead of yearly meetings at the highest levels, there will be a committee that will work for almost 3 years to tailor an agreement and a new COP-meeting in 2015 where, hopefully, the committee can present a substantial deal about climate policy rather than meeting policy that all countries are willing to sign on to. This is the "roadmap" that is presented as the success of COP-17 in Durban.

As, usual, if the expert commentators are to be believed, this agreement, is full of ambiguities, grey areas and explicit holes, but that goes with the territory of international agreements. However, what it effectively does is to reduce the number of opportunities for the global community to actually agree on something with any chance of reaching the goal of no more than 2°C increase of the global mean temperature from three to one. After 2015, experts advise us that we will have to start calculating with more drastic average global temperature increases even if very effective policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions are eventually put into motion. Now, the 2° target, it must be understood, is not in any way magical or set in stone. In fact, some claims it to be a much too allowing goal. Moreover, the target is rather a range than an exact temperature, since the climate models necessarily embody rather drastic uncertainties. But the 2°C is of importance for two reasons. First, it is one of the very few substantial things about climate policy that the global community has been able to agree on. Second, it approximates the limit of our empirical knowledge from the past and, thus, our basis for prediction, preparation and adaption in face of the various changes that increases of the global mean temperature bring. A bit simplified, beyond 2°C, what we have is basically mathematics and fantasy – something that is amply illustrated by the predictive models in climate change research. Our ability to prepare for whatever will be coming – and thus to be capable of reversing the process without considerable higher cost to human life and well-being – becomes drastically weakened. So, seen in this light, the bare bones of COP-17 is that such a prospect has become 66% more likely by agreeing on one attempt to agree rather than three.

Now, if any politically minded person reads this, he or she will probably protest. The reasoning above ignores that the model of yearly meetings at the highest level has a solid record of failure, and that the Durban roadmap means that a committee will be working for three years before the next meeting. This is a big different to the situation where initiatives were left to individual countries or leagues of such. They will say: the basic problems – the unwillingness of high emission countries to commit to the needed reductions and the unwillingness of rich countries to face the fact that if they do not pay for the needed measures, no one will – necessitates that whatever proposal is presented at the next meeting is well worked out in the eyes of all sides and parties. I accept this logic of the pragmatics of politics, but I am skeptical about the conclusion. In fact, when not having the spotlights of the world stage on them, isn't it even more likely that high emission countries will continue to press even more heavily the rest for more concessions and rich countries do the same to less rich ones? Then, when the result is on the table,  all that will remain is the window-dressing that makes it look OK in the eyes of the public, while under the shiny surface mostly expressing short-term and, in this context, petty national interests. In short, committee, fine – but let's speed up and have one working while keeping on having at least one high-level meeting every year to ensure public and critical scrutiny the whole way!

Looking at things from that angle, however, implies a standpoint that fit most politicians pretty bad. It means, for example, acknowledging that this year's COP meeting, just as the former ones, was a massive failure. Not, as this commentary from UK Energy Secretary Chris Huhne tries to spin, a series of successes. Why is this so repugnant to a politician? Well, basically, because of two things. First, in the current situation, where the unholy CO2 emission alliance of Brazil, China, India, South Africa and the USA, are allowed to keep bullying the rest of the world, everything that is an avoidance of total disaster is possible to hold out as success. This is what the statements of Secretary Huhne and a whole band of European politicians are illustrating today. The presence of the climate policy boogeyman (i.e. above mentioned countries) is used to make oneself appear as a hero when, in fact, what has occurred is that one has let oneself be pressed one more notch in the shortsighted game of chicken played by these countries. In this game, apparently, Europe and the rest of the Kyoto-protocol signing countries are allowing themselves to become what game theorists know as money pumps – someone who is applying a strategy that makes one systematically vulnerable to making deals that sum up to a loosing position, while one's counterpart is systematically winning, although each singular deal may look like a winner. Giving in to blackmail (which is, effectively, what Europe is doing in the climate policy negotiation game) is a prime example.

On a larger scale, what is achieved by the Eurpean (plus Canada and Japan) strategy is the following: Brazil, China, India, South Africa and the USA can go hone from Durban, as they could from Copenhagen and Cancún, telling their people that all is well and that they needn't worry. They don't have to tell them that they need to change their expectations to future material growth, the price of energy or anything like that. Why not? Because they have ample evidence that they can press other countries to pay all those bills the day when they arrive. In effect, we may expect no, repeat no, preparation on the political home-fronts of these countries for a climate deal in 2015 which implies making actual concessions and taking on actual commitments. This, I claim, is the main result of the strategy of the EU and the rest of the world in Durban. So ask yourself, how likely does a substantial climate policy deal in 2015 look in that light?

Good work, Europe!

Read Entire Chapt. 1 of My New Book Online for Free

Springer, who publish my new book on the ethical basis of the precautionary principle, The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, has permitted Google books to make the entire first chapter available for online reading. Here it is embedded:




And if you rather prefer that, here's a link to the Google books site. And here's a presentation of the book from a recent post, with links for sampling other chapters and look at the index.

My Book on the Ethical Basis of the Precautionary Principle is Out!

So, some shameless self-promotion:

My book on the ethical basis of the precautionary principle, The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, is now officially released by Springer. To view the table of contents, sample substantial portions of chapters and look up names or subjects in the index, click on the button below:

 Here's the content summary in all of its glory:

Since a couple of decades, the notion of a precautionary principle plays a central and increasingly influential role in international as well as national policy and regulation regarding the environment and the use of technology. Urging society to take action in the face of potential risks of human activities in these areas, the recent focus on climate change has further sharpened the importance of this idea. However, the idea of a precautionary principle has also been problematised and criticised by scientists, scholars and policy activists, and been accused of almost every intellectual sin imaginable: unclarity, impracticality, arbitrariness and moral as well as political unsoundness. In that light, the very idea of precaution as an ideal for policy making rather comes out as a dead end. On the basis of these contrasting starting points, Christian Munthe undertakes an innovative, in-depth philosophical analysis of what the idea of a precautionary principle is and should be about. A novel theory of the ethics of imposing risks is developed and used as a foundation for defending the idea of precaution in environmental and technological policy making against its critics, while at the same time avoiding a number of identified flaws. The theory is shown to have far-reaching consequences for areas such as bio-, information- and nuclear technology, and global environmental policy in areas such as climate change. The author argues that, while the price we pay for precaution must not be too high, we have to be prepared to pay it in order to act ethically defensible. A number of practical suggestions for precautionary regulation and policy making are made on the basis of this, and some challenges to basic ethical theory as well as consumerist societies, the global political order and liberal democracy are identified

Thank you for your kind attention!

Nuclear Power and Climate Change – No Easy Fix

The massive earthquake and following tsunami hitting Japan yesterday, today had a first serious secondary effect in the form of a large explosion in a nuclear power plant close to Fukushima, causing physical injuries and severe structural damage – thus adding to an already quite serious situation of other nuclear power plants in the same area:



This picture, circulated by global news media illustrates the amount of damage to the external structure caused by the explosion:

The problems started already yesterday, when the tsunami caused electrical failures that incapacitated the technological installments meant to control the temperature of another plant in the Fukushima area. Already then, radioactivity was emitted and tens of thousands of people where relocated for protection, and plans for venting radioactive gas into the air to release the pressure inside the reactor was made official. The explosion in the second plant means that the problems have significantly escalated, it now includes five nuclear reactors and the evacuation scale has been  doubled; now to cover a 20 km radius around the plants. If not before, both plants' cooling systems are now declared completely out of order. The Japanese agency for radiation protection has gone public with warnings that there is a risk of a bona fide "meltdown" – i.e. a Chernobyl type development that may cause massive radioactive emissions and ruin a large area around the plant for any sort of human activity or habitation for a very long period of time. This, however, is denied by the Tokyo Electric Power Company, that owns and runs the plants. According to them, the technology is of a sort that will stop the process of nuclear fission as the temperature rises – that is, assuming – I would personally like to add – that no vital parts of this technology has been damaged due to the precedent events. In any case, there will be substantial emissions of radioactivity due both to the explosion and the venting, and factors such as wind conditions will determine how this will immediate affect japanese people. Reports and further footage of all of this can be found here, here, here, here, here, here and here (in my own country, here, here and here) and in numerous other places. And here is an excellent link for keeping yourself updated on this matter.

Now, besides all of the tragedy directly caused by these and the related events, this development also provides some important perspectives on the recent return in Western countries of  strong nuclear power advocacy and support in view of the threats created by climate change due to green house gas emissions. This angle has revived the political leverage of the nuclear power lobby's old environmentalist argument, now beefed up with supporting claims about technology that guarantees that no Chernobyl scenario would be possible even if there was to be serious incidents in the plants. In my forthcoming book, The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, I assess this argument with rather pessimistic conclusions. Seen in a larger context, where the not only immediate security but also the serious long-term waste problems of nuclear energy are taken into account, there are much better alternatives for dealing with the challenge of ensuring energy production in the face of climate change. However, the recent events in Japan adds a further layer of doubt regarding the idea of nuclear power as the easy fix of climate change problems.

The events we now see unfolding in Japan need to be viewed simultaneously through four lenses: (1) Japan is a vastly rich and technologically well-developed country and its nuclear technology can therefore be assumed to be top notch, (2) for historical reasons, Japan is well-known to host a very demanding security culture when it comes to nuclear power, (3) what has broken down the security measures in this case are concentrated powers of nature, and (4) one of the main aspects of climate change scenarios are about how familiar patterns of where and when concentrations of such powers, resulting in events severely threatening human life and infrastructure, may change in virtually unpredictable ways.

Now, for sure, climate change will not directly affect the movements of Earth's shell – the basic cause of earth quakes and tsunamis. However, it does massively affect large-scale patterns of interaction between water, air, land and biological life (whether or not this may interact with the basic geological forces causing earth quakes, I don't know). I'm not any sort of expert in the field, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand the basic uncertainties that this creates regarding temperature and sea levels, weather patterns, and so on. This adds severe complications to the context of any risk-benefit analysis of the idea of the developed world securing its access to energy in the face of climate change through a vast expansion of nuclear power. We have seen what one single earth quake and an ensuing tsunami means in a case where none of the excuses about lax security measures or dated technology wielded in the Chernobyl case are accessible. In the face of the severe uncertainties regarding very powerful concentrations of natural powers created by climate change, how can we in a responsible and cost-effective way decide such things as the proper construction of nuclear power plants, their location, and a suitable system for managing the waste problem?

It is not given, of course, that the answer to these questions have to be that we cannot. However, the apparently tempting piece of chocolate made up of the idea of managing climate change while not having to pay much of a price in terms of energy production cannot be taken seriously until thorough risk analysis is undertaken. Such an analysis needs to not – as is otherwise commonplace – assume basic patterns of nature making up the context of factors determining the security of any sort of installation to be static or foreseeable as linear predictions. It has to address the uncertainty regarding these factors created by climate change scenarios head on, as it has to include the costs needed to guarantee sufficient security in the light of such uncertainties.

Grow Your Steak? The Case for In Vitro Meat (now with addendum)

In today's issue of Dagens Nyheter (Sweden's leading daily, followed up here) it is reported that a research team at the Chalmers University of Technology under the leadership of Julie Gold – Associate Professor of Biological Physics – are making serious and so far rather successful attempts to grow actual (red) meat in the lab on the basis of single cellular components. Professor Gold motivates the research from salient environmentalist reasons, based on the proven climate effects of global meat production (although the size of this part of the problem is currently debated).

Another obvious reason not mentioned by Gold in her short statement has to do with animal welfare concerns. Industrial meat production in practice necessarily and systematically degrades and tortures animals, an effect that can be avoided completely if the vision of Gold and her colleagues can be realised on a large scale. Also, the approach has a clear advantage to biotechnological solutions to agricultural production problems regarding grain and vegetables, since in vitro meat production will be practically possible to confine to closed off production plants, thus avoiding the many risks surrounding GMO regarding long term ecological side-effects.

Now, an immediate reaction to this line of reasoning is this: but why take this detour over lengthy and probably expensive lab experiments when there is the simple solution of humanity making the change to a vegetarian diet? This point is partly valid, but ignores the realities of politics and policy making, especially in democracies. Eating meat is a firmly established gastronomical practice in many many countries. In addition, the agricultural lobby is a powerful political force in many countries – France being the obvious example in Europe. Making real moves to severely restrict or impede meat consumption and production would in most cases be sheer political suicide by any government. In today's political climate it may be added that such political acts of seppuku can be expected to be exploited by political forces on the darker end of the scale.

Thus, the in vitro meat vision indeed seems to have a lot going for it from a moral point of view. It remains to be seen how the scientific prospect develops as research continues.

Addendum:
A few hours after having posted this blog piece, I found the homepage of the In Vitro Meat Concortium. Also there, the animal welfare argument is missing, but they add a few others having to do with the negative side-effects of transporting livestock and meat across the globe.

And here, you will find a visionary article from 2005 from the journal Tissue Engineering - including a number of further references at the bottom of the page addressing connected ethical issues.

A Starter and a note on COP 15

So, this is just to get things going. For those of you who may have an interest in my academic doings, just follow the "learn more here" link to the left!

What is more timely than saying something of the debunked COP 15 climate change policy summit. I've already encountered a chorus of reactions coming from such diverse sources as high politicians (several of them present in Copenhagen), supposedly well-informed academics and journalists, as well as the regular Joe and Jane, all blaming developing countries – in particular, China – for the meager outcome. The problem with this analysis is its obvious lack of consideration of the nature of the political challenge inherent in these negotiations, and how the various parties (if not all) so bluntly fail to face up to it.

Climate change policy would have been easy had it not been for its costliness for us all (in terms of money, short-term comfort, etcetera). True, the overall costs are justifiable in view of the threats faced – which is the basis of the idea of having a global upper limit on climate influencing emissions. However, the costs also need to be distributed in some way between the involved parties, and this is where the problems start. For what we see is what game and decision theorists usually refer to as a game of chicken, where each party do its best to press the others to agree to a deal serving this individual party's self-interest. This may result in a deal being made. However, since this takes time and since the climate change scenarios grow grimmer and less predictable the more time that passes, this strategy creates a threat of locking climate change policy into a situation where we all become magnificent losers due to our success in serving our own interests. This is what, in research, is often called a prisoner's dilemma. One of the really nasty features of this dilemma is that there is no way out of it: the only way to escape is to avoid being locked into it, and there are numerous strategies for that.

Now, one would have supposed that all the world leaders, as well as their numerous advisers understand this, since it is basic course 1A for anyone who goes into politics to learn to spot prisoner's dilemmas and to construct strategies to avoid them. And in the case of COP 15 and climate change policy, the first obvious step is to stop playing the chicken game! In the present case, as in most other cases, what is needed for that is to stop being entirely guided by self-interest (or to expand one's self-interest to include the interests of the others). That is, recognize that quite reasonable worries had by all parties in connection to the costs of climate policy. This is where the flaw of the "the Chinese did it"-analysis becomes obvious.

China's economic growth over the past few decades is stunning, but essentially China is still a rather poor country if we look at the wealth/citizen. So what worries China is that its (future) citizens will be robbed of too much forthcoming growth as a result of a climate policy deal. Developed countries have similar worries, but rather regarding loosing too much of already acquired wealth. At the same time, both sides know that a price in terms of lost wealth will have to be paid.

What this means is that, when i deal is not reached, no particular side is more to blame than the other, unless a move has been made that can be understood as either blatantly destroying the prerequisites for negotiation, or by trying to play chicken in disguise. The "China did it"-analysis is a claim regarding the first of these strategies for placing blame. China just refused making a deal, that is true, but why did they do that? Had developed countries invited China and the rest of the developing world to consider a generous offer, we could indeed have concluded that China did it. But this is not what happened. The developed world extended a shame bid, particularly through the declarations made by the US quite early on about a, given the circumstances, quite ridiculous 4% reduction of fossil fuel emissions. This opening bid of the richest and most powerful country of the world made clear to China as well as the rest of the world that this player would indeed play chicken, and the rest of us should just be grateful for being allowed to play the part of the suckers. So China walked away from the table, and quite reasonably so.

Simply put, the COP 15 could have become something, had the developed world only extended a serious offer. In view of the prospective burdens on developing countries of any climate policy deal, this did not occur.