An Improved Model Definition of Antisemitism

1. The need for a clear definition of "antisemitism"
A few years back, I blogged about the savvy tactic of the Netanyahu government to accuse virtually all criticism of the Israel occupation policy as antisemitic. Since then, more complex disputes have evolved at higher levels, not least the debate and controversy around antisemitism within the Corbyn led Labour party in the UK. Also in my own country, the thorny issue of how to draw the line between legitimate (not meaning necessarily sound) criticism of decisions made by the government of Israel and judgements that deny jewish people equal rights or has taken public stage, connected to repeated reports of antisemitic harassment and hatespeech in the city of Malmö, and an harassment case regarding Jewish phycisians at the Karolinska University Hospital in Stockholm. All of these cases have actualised tricky issues on how to define the line between legitimate political criticism against acts of the Israeli government, and (ethno)racist harassment or hatespeech targetting jewish people.

The issue has become extra complicated with the rise of a new "nationalist" far-right conservative political (more easily, Fascist) movement  across Europe. Albeit targetting muslims and "migrants" has been a main theme in the political rhetorics in these circles, antisemitic themes and tropes are commonplace. This regards, of course, the now well-known cases of the Fidesz-ruled Hungary, and the PiS-ruled Poland (both countries with a long history of widespread antisemitism in the culture, no matter the regime). But also in Sweden, where antisemitic attitudes have a comparably weak hold, open hatred against Jews and open antisemitic attitudes have been a standing occurrence from the Sweden Democrats party, even its highest circles of leadership. Even political pundits linked to the more traditional conservative side of politics have been starting to flaunt obvious antisemitic tropes in their public statements. The perhaps most well-known and obvious case being the former op-ed editor, now mainly op-ed writer, of the Göteborgsposten daily, and ideaological consultant of the Moderaterna classic conservative party, Alice Teodorescu, who shortly before the Swedish general election of 2018 labelled holocaust survivors who went public with parallels between the current political development in Europe and Sweden and that in 1930's Germany as "agents of the political left", ironically proving said holocaust survivors right by using the classic trope of porttraying Jews as spokespersons and forerunners of a leftwing conspiracy.

In this landscape, it has become increasingly difficult to navigate, as the Israeli government marks any criticism as antisemitic, obvious antisemitic hatespeech, tropes and images within the Palestine movement and other critics of Israel are shrugged off as legitimate criticism of Israel, while many feel an increasing need to protest against the increasing antisemitism from the new fascism and politically conservative right. As the fight over the concept of antisemitism continues, Jews as well as all anti-racists are being caught in the middle.  At the heart of the problem is that there is no well-designed and generally approved definition of "antisemitism". In fact, I was stunned to find out, the only thing there is, is a "non legally binding working defintion" issued by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. As no alternative determination of the concept exists, this definition has been used (though not officially adopted or approved) by the European Commission and Parliament, and adopted by the federal US government.

However, the definition has also drawn criticism for confusing the line between legitimate political criticism of the Israeli government, and hatespeech, harassment etc. targetting jews. I agree with portions of this criticism and, in addition, as a philosopher, I find the definition poorly constructed from a technical point of view. In this post I will therefore use the IHRA working defintion as a stepping stone for presenting a more accurate and better constructed defintion. The result, I will call a "Model Definition of Antisemitism", thereby signalling that I believe this suggestions to move the work of defining "antisemitism" from the "working" stage to the stage of presenting an actual prototype for use in legislation and political and moral judgement.

2. Improving the IHRA Working Definition
The IHRA definition starts off with a generic characterization of "antisemitism", and this is the part that a philosopher would call an actual definition:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.

Immediately following this rather vague statement (what counts as "hatred", and what "manifestations" are implied?) comes a generic clarification, which must be sen as part of the diefinition.

Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Thus far, the definition looks pretty ok. However, one unclarity can be found in the first two sentences of the second quote. Together, these may be read to imply that the state of Israel is "a Jewish collectivity", not only that criticising the Israeli government's actions in terms of condemnation of "jews" is antisemitic. This muddle is unfortunate. Of course, jews may be citizens of any country, and the state or government of Israel cannot be assumed to represent jews everywhere, and citizens of Israel need not be jews (so the collectivity of Israel is thereby not "Jewish", albeit a lot of israelis are jewish and Jewish culture is central to israeli life).

Additionally, these descriptions fail to make a distinction that, if ignored, often causes confusion in debates on whether or not some phenomenon or person is antisemitic. This is the distinction between, on the one hand, a person harbouring antisemitic ideas, and, on the other, some manifestation communicating, expressing and/or spreading antisemitism. For instance, when I pointed out on Twitter how Alice Teodorescu's inciting attack on holocaust survivors fitted several counts of the IHRA definition of "antisemitism", I had a storm of responses from her supporters that it was preposterous to suggest that she is antisemitic. This is, of course, is completely irrelevant when assessing her statements – a person may express antisemitism without being antisemitic. At the same time, if the antisemitism of some manifestation is pointed out but the person behind them continue to use them, this will be empirical evidence supporting the idea that this person actually endorses antisemitism.

To improve the definition in this respect, I therefore suggest the following revision:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews, or rhetorical and physical manifestations directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. This perception may be held by a person, and communicated through different types of manifestations. While criticism of the government of Israel similar to that leveled against any other government cannot be regarded as antisemitic, manifestations that has such criticism take the form of targeting Jews or Jewish people rather than political decisions and holders of political offices is antisemitic. Antisemitic manifestations frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

 Following this opening, generic characterization, the IHRA working definition then adds a list of examples of what may be included in contemporary antisemitic manifestations. In tghis quote, I have added numbers for more easy referral to items on the list, in the original the items are seprated by dots:

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

1. Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.

2. Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

3. Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

4. Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

5. Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust. 

6. Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations. 

7. Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor. 

8. Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation. 

9. Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. 

10. Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis. 

11. Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

It is important to note that this kind of list is, from a conceptual analytical standpoint, an entirely different animal than the proper definition given earlier. A list like this is more like an amendment, or implementation guide, and not really part of the definition itself. The list must therefore not serve to arbitrarily expand the concept, as it has already been characterised in the generic definition. Moreover, the list shoud ideally be brief, and items that could be subsumed as instances of other items should be taken off the list to avoid confusion. With these aspects in mind we may match the items on the list against the revised generic characterisation, and the other items of the list. I will start with the question if some items can be sorted under others.

Of the items, 1-4 seem perfectly legitimate. No. 5, however, while being an accurate example of typical antisemitic manifestations, it falls under the domains of items 2-4, as one of many specific examples. Likewise, item no. 6 falls under item 2 and 3. Furthermore, item no. 11 seems to be a particular instance of item 3, especially if item 3 is clarified to include states. Finally, item 10 would seem to sort under item 4. A first revision of the list in view of making it more coherent and brief, would therefore read: 

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to: 

1. Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion

 2. Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions. 

3. Accusing Jews as indivuals or a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by another Jewish person, group, institution or state, or even for acts committed by non-Jews

4. Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

5. Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

6. Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation. 

7. Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. 




We come now to the question if all the remaining items can be supported by the generic characterisation. Here, I find only one item problematic, namely no. 5. The problem with this item is that it is perfectly possible to hold the political philosophical view that no people of any kind have any right to self-determination without being antisemitic in the sense of the generic characterisation. This view is a general scepticism to the notion of the nation state as a moral (rather than practical) category. This view implies that also Jewish people lack such a right (thus falling under item no. 5), but without in any way treating Jewish people worse than any other people, or discriminate against jews. What would be antisemitic would be to afford a right of self-determination to other peoples, but not to the Jewish people. A case in point would, for example be, if the Palestinian people is afforded a right to self-determination while the Jewish people is denied such a right (conversely, affording the right to the Jewish people but not to the palestinian people would be "anti-palestinianism"). But if the item is rephrased to that effect, it will fall under item 6 (regarding double standards). Therefore, my suggestion is that also item 5 on the revised list is removed.

3. A Model Definition of "Antisemitism"
The outcome of this little exercise is, then, the following proposal for a model definition of the notion of "antisemitism". This definition provides a more coherent, brief and applicable guide for determining whether or not some phenomenon is antisemitic or not. For example, the Teodorescu statement about holocaust survivors who bear witness of the 1930's being "agents of the political left" clearly falls under item 2, and possibly also under item 4 (if historical facts regarding the Holocaust include its political precedence. many of the examples from islamist propaganda, as well as propaganda within the Labour party of the UK (such as classic antisemitic trope images that have been used for centuries for antisemitic purposes). But claims from any of these parties regarding the justification of, e.g., Israeli settler policy on occupied land, or the "shoot to kill" policy of IDF forces at the border between occupied territory and Israel proper would not be antisemitic at all. I believe this definition, unlike that of IHRA, to be fit for incorporation into actual legal statute, as well as policy declarations that guide the actions of international institutions, states, business as well as NGO's.


Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews, or rhetorical and physical manifestations directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. This perception may be held by a person, and communicated through different types of manifestations. While criticism of the government of Israel similar to that leveled against any other government cannot be regarded as antisemitic, manifestations that has such criticism take the form of targeting Jews or Jewish people rather than political decisions and holders of political offices is antisemitic. Antisemitic manifestations frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.
 
Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to: 

1. Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion

 2. Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions. 

3. Accusing Jews as indivuals or a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by another Jewish person, group, institution or state, or even for acts committed by non-Jews

4. Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

5. Applying double standards by requiring of the state of Israel a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation. 

6. Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. 

*

The Inevitable Endpoint of EU Refugee and Border Policy Spells Genocide

There has been abundant reporting recently on the continuously ongoing exercise in inhumanity that is European Union refugee policy. Alas, the focus is often on singular incident, such as the recent tragedy of the sunken both that had at least 700 die of drowning in the Mediterranean (here, here, here). However, already several month ago, BBC reported that in the course of just a few months last year, over 2 200 people were estimated to have lost their lives due to similar causes in these deadly sea. A more recent report from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is cited by the same source as implicating an expectation of the number of people meeting similar destinies in the Mediterranean alone will reach 30 000 this year (also reported here), and other sources note that the number of refugee deaths in the Mediterranean is already 30 times higher this year compared to the same period in the former. A detailed map of all registered deaths since the year 2000 can be found here.

As dryly noted by well-known public health educator, and my countryman, Hans Rosling in a recent video – rhetorically answering the cynical question why refugees don't fly instead, as this is much cheaper and safer – the primary cause of this development can be located almost entirely in the inhuman border and refugee policies of the European Union and its member states:

 

***

True to this essence of European policy in this area, in the 2014, the UK announced that it would cancel all further engagement in missions to rescue victims of capsizing refugee boats, leading to sharp reactions, e.g., from Amnesty International. In a similar spirit, the European Union has reacted to the more recent outcries, with a 10-point plan, most of which is nothing else than just more of business as usual, as noted by, e.g., Human Rights Watch. For the essence of EU border and refugee policy is to stretch its supposed commitment to international asylum agreements to its limits, bearing in mind that the right to ask for asylum starts at the border points of a country and keep the eyes shut to the devastating consequences of this sort of policy:

1. KEEP THEM OUT! 

"the EU's maritime patrolling operations in the Mediterranean, called Triton and Poseidon"

"capture and destroy vessels used by the people smugglers" 

2. PREFERABLY BY PREVENTING THEM FROM NEVER ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE!

 "EU will engage with countries surrounding Libya through a joint effort between the Commission and the EU's diplomatic service."

"The EU will deploy immigration liaison officers abroad to gather intelligence on migratory flows and strengthen the role of the EU delegations

3. AND IF THEY HAPPEN TO REACH THE EU, GET THEM OUT AS QUICK AS POSSIBLE!

"European Union's asylum support office will to deploy teams in Italy and Greece for joint processing of asylum applications."

"EU governments will fingerprint all migrants."

"EU will consider options for an "emergency relocation mechanism" for migrants."

"EU will establish a new return program for rapid return of "irregular" migrants coordinated by EU agency Frontex from the EU's Mediterranean countries."

At the same time, similar thinking is shaping this adaption to European Union border and refugee policy standards by Bulgaria (along its border to Turkey), which hopes to be admitted as full member shortly and therefore implements this perversity, apparently failing to note the bitter ironic link to its own iron curtain past (also here):

***

This is the voice of three monkeys failing to register the complete unsustainability of their chosen path. Or, let me be more precise, this path is completely unsustainable as long as the European Union recognises the notion of its lack of rights to commit organised mass murder. For at the end of the day, this is the only conceivable endpoint that this policy can have.

The idea that capturing a few criminals, currently exploiting the desperate situation of refugees created by European Union policies, would somehow make said refugees stop attempting to finalise their escape is nothing but plain stupidity. Once these bands are dealt with, there will instead be the initiatives of others, not least refugees themselves and ordinary people trying to help them. For the need to escape is not created by these minor border bands of cynic criminals, those are mere symptoms of an infinitely more cynic and inferior way of responding to the ever present needs that have had refugees on their way across history and the world since the dawn of humanity. At that point, the EU will face the choice of continuing the policy and thus deploy the military and police forces referred to in its 10-point programme to start attacking the refugees themselves, besides anyone aiding them. Similarly regarding the idea to "engage with countries surrounding Libya" (and other bordering countries, as the need arises) and "strengthen the role of the EU delegations", effectively to have bordering countries set up concentration camps funded by the EU, to effectively lock the refugees up to stop further escape (a recent analysis by Doctor's without Borders of how bad the situation is in this respect already now is here). Again, the question then arises what will be the EU policy when these incarcerated people – as they have all reason and every moral right to do – attempt to break out. In both cases, the logic of current EU policy seems to dictate  nothing less than genocide. Whether or not it is performed by proxy or bona fide European armed personnel is, in this case, completely irrelevant.

But, of course, my point is that this analysis demonstrates the complete unsustainability of current European Union border and migration policy. Especially pondering that current refugee and migration streams are in fact nothing compared to what may be expected in the future due to the effects of climate change and other environmental problems (also effecting economic and social instability and war in their aftermath), one can easily see that it can end up nowhere else than in massive genocide on desperate people fleeing destitution or other dire circumstances. Pondering the constitutional backbones of the EU, such as the European Convention of Human Rights (not to speak of EU member states' uniform commitment to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide), this should effect careful consideration of the increasingly apparent folly of the current policy path among European policy makers and high officials. Is this how you want to end up; as mass murderers on a grand scale – is that what Europe and the European Union is about? This is the question that those three monkeys desperately seek to avoid.

Next Step in Hungary's March Back to Dark and Brown Political Legacy: Official Historical Revisionism to Hide Pro-nazi Past

This was brought to my attention by my friend and colleague at the University of Gothenburg, distinguished political science professor, Bo Rothstein. As some of you may know, after a brief time of emerging out of its Soviet satelite past and joining the EU as a liberal democracy, Hungary has for some time been moving in an increasingly extreme rightwing, nationalist, anti-liberal and anti-democratic direction. Led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban of the Fidesz party, increasing assaults have been made on basic democratic principles – to the extent that the EU has been reprimanding some of the plans harshly, short of threatening of expelling the country from the union altogether. Earlier this year, Orban declared that he viewed China, Russia and Turkey as rolemodels to follow, and that he wants to abandon liberal democracy in favor of an “illiberal state”. This follows a process starting in 2002, of cooperating with openly nazi racist organisations and semi-militias over several years to deliberately dismantle and undermine Hungarian democratic institutions and freedom of opinion and speech, as well as weakening basic principles of ascertaining rule of law and legal security. Some further reports are here, here, here, here, here.

Therefore, it should perhaps come as no surprise that this march towards the darker regions of modern central European history is now being complemented by a historical revisionist agenda, aiming to hide Hungary's dirty past in this area. Bo's open letter (published as a Swedish debate article here) to the Swedish Hungarian ambassador describes it as it is – an image of the monument is seen above (view a larger version by clicking the image):

The lie that Bo here uncovers should come as no surprise, as one of the few things that have potential of tripping the populist far-right nationalist politics pursued by Fidesz is its obvious links to the nazi-past of Hungary. Hence, that past needs to be erased, and into the Hungarian collective mind should be installed a lilly-white version of the innocent maiden, where the blood stained hands of mindless butcher, selling out its country for a slice of the cake of the promised 1000-ear Reich, belongs. That's Victor Orban and Fidesz for you in so many words.

Will Sweden Withstand the Planned EU Tobacco Directive Rules on Cigarette Packet Warning Labels?

News just broke that the current Swedish government is planning to try to resist the planned implementation of a new EU tobacco directive application according to which cigarette packets must have warning labels covering 75% of the packet's surface space. Why on earth would the government of one of the world's top non- and anti-smoking and pro public health countries in this way want to do the tobacco industry's dirty business for them, one might ask. But according to the government, this matter is nothing of the sort. The reason given for why the government plans to resist the proposal is that it allegedly in conflict with the Swedish constitution, more specifically The Freedom of the Press Act (FoP, the original Swedish version of the act, Tryckfrihetsförordningen, or TF, can be read here).

I suppose that what the government think is problematic with regard to the EU tobacco directive proposal in relation to this, is the very strong ban on censorship in the FoP and a very tightly regulated possibility to prosecute for misuse, expressed in the first four articles of the 1st chapter of FoP. However, I very much doubt that any of these generous liberties can be convinsingly argued to apply to cigarette packets. First, altready in article 5, the scope of the act is defined to apply...

...provided:
1.    a valid certificate of no legal impediment to publication exists in respect of the written matter; or
2.    the written matter is supplied with a note indicating that it has been duplicated and, in association therewith, clear information concerning the identity of the person who duplicated it and the year and place of duplication.

Most cigarette packets will be excluded already st this stage. However, tobacco companies may of course come to have the packets designed so that this condition is met. This will not help the argument of the government much, however, for in article 6 the scope of the act is further limited with regard to what written or printed matter it regulates:

Printed matter shall not be deemed to be such unless it is published. Printed matter is deemed to have been published when it has been delivered for sale or dissemination by other means within the Realm. This does not however apply to printed documents of a public authority to which there is no public access.

Are cigarette packets published?, one may ask. Well they are produced through printing and then publicly offered, aren't they? Well, incidentally they are, but they are surely not sold or otherwise disseminated in the sense intended in the law. First, what is sold are the cigarettes, the packet is a container that is not for sale, albeit accompanying the sold product. We could, of course, imagine tobacco companies try to claim that it is the packet that is the product, and that the cigarettes are just an incidental appendice. However, I hardly think that such a move would exempt them from paying tax on tobacco sales. Therefore, the packet is not what is sold. Neither is it disseminated, since that would imply, e.g., that the address label attached to or any sort of scribbling on a packet of newspapers, books et cetera would be protected by the FoP. Surely they are not.

However, I need not rest my case on that argument alone, for if we continue reading, we come to the crucial article 9, wehre it is said that....

The provisions of this Act notwithstanding, rules laid down in law shall govern:
1. bans on commercial advertising insofar as the advertisement is employed in the marketing of alcoholic beverages or tobacco products; /.../

3. bans on commercial advertising introduced for the protection of health or the environment in accordance with obligations pursuant to accession to the European Communities;

What this implies is that as long as the cigarette packets qualify as either "marketting of .... tobacco products" or "commercial advertisement", FoP readily allow either any sort of censoring ban to be applied, or allow such a ban "for the protection of health or the environment in accordance with obligations pursuant to accession to the European Communities". What was this all about again, please? The European Union tobacco directive?? Uh Oh!

Now, I may have gotten all of this terribly wrong and perhaps there is a nice government memo somewhere describing a superb argument for why the EU tobacco directive regulation regarding warning text on cigarette packets is unconstitutional in Sweden. More likely, however, is that if such a memo ever existed it is fundamentally flawed and very possibly a product of sloppy analysis, and will soon find itself crumbling in the waste paper basket of the responsible minister's office. My own proposal is that said minister should inquire his/her legal advisors closely of however they could come up with such folly, and maybe take the opportunity to ask a question or two about their links to the tobacco industry as well.

So, what was the other hypothesis? That the Swedish government is doing the dirty business of tobacco companies for them? It can't be can it?! Especially not since the second argument of the government is that these companies will only have 25% left of the surface space of packets to expose their brand markings. Truly, truly poor them little innocent ones being so unjustly attacked by the vile European Commission!! So it is definitely not a question about that at least - phew!

Follow the 4th Hate Crime Symposium via web streaming!

As you may recall, I have now and again posted in connection to the project When Law and Hate Collide, where I and my assistant David Brax have been active since two years, collaborating with researchers at the law school of the University of Central Lancashire and psychologists and special education researchers at the Göthe Universität Frankfurt. These earlier posts are all assembled here, and among other things they link to videos from symposia arranged within the project in 2011 and 2012.

We are now in the final stages of this project and on tuesday we will hold the final and 4th of these symposia. This will take place on Tuesday, the 29th of January, starting 9 a.m. (CET) in Brussels, but for anyone who wants to follow it, it will be streamed on the web. To do this, 9 a.m. on tuesday, you simply click this link, and the live streaming should start. If there is a problem, wait a while and try again.

The program includes the following presentations:

Bogusia Puchalska (Uclan): European-wide policy and initiatives on hate crime

Christian Munthe & David Brax (Gothenburg): The philosophy of hate crime: concepts, values and tensions in the European context

Michael Fingerle & Caroline Bonnes (Frankfurt): A different perception? What NGOs and victims think about hate crime legislation

Michael Salter & Kim McGuire (Uclan): Issues concerning the victim's recollection of hate crime: avoiding revictimisation

- Keynote invited comments from:
Paul Iganski (Hate crime scholar, Lancaster University)

Joanna Perry (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE).

Paul Gianassi (Hate crime law enforcement expert, UK Ministry of justice)

Henri Nickels (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA)

See you on the web, if not in Brussels!

Videos from The Philosophy of Hate Crime Symposium.

As some of you may recall, in a post earlier this fall, I shared videos from a symposium arranged by a project I'm working in on the basis for European hate crime policy, and informed about a 2nd symposium on philosophical issues actualised in that context that we arranged here in Gothenburg. Even earlier I have made a few posts on issues actualised by the project (on the relation between hate crimes and human rights and on the role of prevention in a sound hate crime policy) and pointed to many more at the blog of my colleague David Brax.

We are now happy to be able to share videos of almost all of the presentations and attached discussions that took place during the Philosophy of Hate Crime Symposium, arranged by David and me at the University of Gothenburg a few months ago. As I myself fell ill on the 2nd day, you will only see me appear in the introduction, but David does a splendid job of holding together by himself what was originally our shared presentation on such short notice in the last video below.

One of the more nice things that I noticed when watching this footage right through was how surprisingly well it captures the atmosphere and spirit at what was a bona fide research workshop, rather than a public engagement event put together for that particular purpose. What you see is an example of what goes on in the laboratory of a research unit in the humanities and social sciences, basically. Welcome to take a peak!

1. Anthony Mark Cutter & Christian Munthe: Introduction to When Law and Hate Collide


2. Paul Iganski: How Hate Hurts: The Moral Philosophical Basis of Hate Crime Laws 



3. Barbara Perry: Moving Beyond "Hate" Crime 



4. Neil Chakraborti: Targetting Vulnerability - A Fresh Set of Challanges for Hate Crime Scholarship 



5. Heidi Hurd: Criminalizing Hate, Criminalizing Character



6. Mohamad Al Hakim: Hate as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing 



7. Antti Kauppinen: Two Kinds of Expressive Harm 



8. David Brax: A Tentative Philosphical Framework for Hate Crime Policy Across the European Union

The Philosophy of Hate Crime Symposium

On Monday and Tuesday the coming week, I and my colleague David Brax, will be hosting the 2nd European hate crime symposium, arranged within the EU project When Law and Hate Collide, on the theme The Philosophy of Hate Crime. The program of the symposium can be viewed here (click pic to enlarge):

During the two days of the symposium, a hand-picked collection of international scholars and experts on the underlying philosophical and ethical issues actualised by the phenomenon of hate crimes and the challenges of designing hate crime policy will present their views. They will, furthermore, discuss with us in the project basic such issues related to the challenge of designing an overarching European hate crime policy with regard to criminal law, monitoring, prevention and public awareness. The symposium will be documented by the University of Gothenburg TV and audiovisual department, for eventual broadcasting through Swedish TV and the internet.

During the symposium, you can follow the action on twitter, using the tag #H8Crime

While waiting for that, it may be of some interest to watch some of the footage done at our first symposium, held in Strasbourg this spring. Below, you find some of the presentations plus a part of the roundtable discussions we had with interested members of the European Parliament (this video has some image damage at the end, but the sound is clear all way through).

1. Anthony Mark Cutter & Keiran M Bellis: Introduction and overview of the European hate crime situation

2. Paul Iganski on what is bad about hate crime

3. Paul Gianassi on the UK law enforcement approach to hate crime

4. Alke Get on German hate crime policy

5. Nathan Hall on what hate crime is and may be

6. Sylvia Lancaster on the Sophie Lancaster hate crime case, and the issue of the scope of hate crime policy

7. Excerpt from roundtable discussion of hate crime, policy concerns and research needs with members of European Parliament