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Yes, indeed you read correctly! The US state of Utah has adopted a bill according to which women who suffer miscarriage are to be assumed guilty of murder, unless proven innocent. In reports from inside and outside the US, the flabbergasted reactions have taken up the themes of the so-called Pro Life movement now showing its true face ("so now we see, they're after women after all"), and the problematic or at least uncertain implications in relation to the classic Supreme Court ruling of Roe vs. Wade from 1974, that paved the way for legal abortion in the Unites States. But, in my view, the problematic aspects of this case go way deeper than that, and has little to do with the moral or legal status of abortion. This bill assaults basic principles of legal security that are a necessity for any country that wants to label itself minimally civilized, whatever regulation of abortion, pregnancy, etcetera, one then might want to adopt.
The bill originated in a case where a 17 year old pregnant woman that had passed the time limit for legal abortion allegedly hired some guy to assault her physically in the hope of thereby inducing a miscarriage. This did not happen, so the guy was convicted for something else than murder, presumably some form of attempt. The woman (technically rather a girl at the time of the event), however, turned out not to be possible to convict for anything. Horror!!! Hence the new bill.
I wonder if it is only us non-Utahits that find this reaction particularly twisted? First, the desperation of the 17-year old girl clearly says something quite salient of the situation that the authorities of Utah leave underage, involuntary pregnant females in. Perhaps doing something about that, huh?! But I presume that the morality underlying the bill would prevent anything in that vein - "Helping a slut? What's the matter with you?!", is the expected reaction. Another case of what becomes of the message of love when unattended to by secular reason - something I have commented on before. Second, an online-acquaintance's spontaneous reaction - as my mother's - to the news about the bill was a hands on analogy with the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, and this strikes me as dead right. This perverse obsession with punishment rather than prevention out of compassion is as clear a sign as anything of the supporters of the Utah bill sharing with the Talibans the same brutal idea of how to react to the plight of others. But this is not my main point.
Neither is my point about this case being another in a quite disturbing trend in developed nations to use the pregnancy as an excuse to treat women as instruments for one thing only: the population of the earth. This recent incident from Florida may remind readers about what I'm talking about. In my work in health care ethics, I have noticed a clear rise in enthusiasm among medical staff regarding the possibility of submitting pregnant women to treatments against their will for the sake of the fetus. Conclusion: women, when pregnant, are to be treated as means only and the worry about where to draw the line is of minor consequence. But let's do what philosophers often do: let us lend the supporters of such ideas the benefit of the doubt. Let's assume for the sake of argument, as the saying goes, that actions of women that endanger fetuses are indeed to be viewed as a potentially criminal offense.
On this assumption, my point is this: the Utah bill prescribes society to apply a principle of presuming all pregnant women undertaking any sort of action that may pose some danger to the health and well-being of the fetus they are carrying as guilty of an offense. It is not society that carries the burden of proof of demonstrating the actual occurrence of this offense, it is the accused. First of all, unless some rather vast changes (that will never pass even the first round of an appellate court and even less the supreme court) in the Utah criminal code are undertaken this implies that men and women are judged according to different basic legal principles. If that does not violate the US constitution, I wonder what does! But this is not all. The whole idea of presuming people guilty of crimes, in particular crimes that may be followed by harsh punishment, violates the most basic principle of a fair, just and sustainable legal system that is to be found. For, comically as it would be had it not been for the brutal stupidity of it all, as people like Stalin have proven beyond reasonable doubt, the only consistent application of this principle is the incarceration of the entire population. For, of course, men will have to be judged by the same standard, and as we know, one of the main threats to the health and well-being of women is the actions of men.
And here's the real irony of it all: the bill seems to imply that the entire population of political representatives that voted in favor of the bill, as the public servants that will be enforcing it, have to be prosecuted for exactly the crime described by the very same bill! One needs just a minimum of empathy and imagination to understand the effects of the Utah bill on the pregnant women of Utah. Whatever they do, they will risk having the police banging on the door, dragging them off on a presumed murder charge. For, as we know, anything a pregnant woman does may have effects (given the circumstances) that makes more probable some downside for the fetus. So, the main effect of this new policy will be the inducement of severe fear and stress on pregnant women - a factor well-documented to pose a serious health risk to both woman and fetus. So, come on you Utah law-makers, let's have it all out and see you in court!
Monday, 1 March 2010
Thursday, 11 February 2010
How our Compassion Reveals a Moral Abyss
Yesterday, BBC reported that the official death toll of the Haiti disaster is now 230 000, thus approaching the sum of lives claimed by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Just as with the Tsunami, people and nations all over the world have reacted as we all expect from a standard of minimal decency: with horror and compassion put into action. Massive support programs have been set in motion to come to aid in the face of the unspeakable suffering and large numbers of voluntary individuals with useful skills have devoted time, resources and energy to the same end. Let it be that some of the initiatives have seen a bit odd, like the fixation of the US on tools of violence as the top priority when sending over 10 000 troops, or the outright bizarre, like this case that I covered in a former posting.
All of this is in line with the complex model of the human cognitive, emotional and motivational apparatus so famously sketched by David Hume in the 18th century: Besides experiencing and caring for ourselves, we have the evident natural ability to know the plight of others and the innate drive to be motivated by this knowledge. This picture still holds in most respects as modern psychological research and cognitive science advances - in fact, most of what is done in these fields build essentially on the basic psychological models of Hume. Similarly, modern science debunks the simplistic picture of human nature as essentially self-centered and egoistic in much the same way as Hume and his approximate contemporary Bishop Joseph Butler did: All of the tricks employed by advocates of psychological egoism to explain away evidence of non-selfish human motivation rests on a faulty picture of the human cognitive and motivational apparatus. What the psychological egoist would claim about our compassion and willingness to help in the face of the Haiti tragedy is that these things are mere side-effects of our striving for an emotional or material reward. Obviously, we may forget the material side - no one expects anything back from Haiti or its people; we even tolerate and understand that they are many times angry and disappointed at the result of the aid efforts when these fall short of meeting the needs. But the egoist has one more card up his sleeve, namely, the conjecture that we help because we strive for the feeling of satisfaction that being helpful provides. This argument, however, as Butler and Hume pointed out, puts the carriage in front of the horse, since it fails to take into account the source of the feeling of satisfaction: the fact that we need or want to come to aid. This is what motivates us - the emotional reward comes afterward. Modern cognitive science confirms this picture in terms of the biochemistry involved in motivation, emotion and feeling. The role of the neurological reward system is to uphold a system of motivation that in itself is not directed at achieving rewards or avoiding punishment, but at doing whatever it is one strives or wants to do. Only in special circumstances will our motivational attention be directed at the effects of the reward system (such as when we push ourselves to do something that we have a strong motivation not to do).
However, as Hume noted, our motivational capacities are at the same time rather arbitrary when it comes to our relations to other people, depending in turn on what associations between ourselves and others that are present in the mind. So, although we have that natural capacity for perceiving the emotional states of others that Hume called sympathy, and that enables us to identify the feelings, moods and affective states of others in terms of similarity and closeness to our own mental states, what we do in response to such perceptions is a rather open question. Moral reasoning, therefore, has to be about making such responses systematic and coherent, or at least to formulate an ideal pattern of motivational responses that we accept as desirable - the virtues in terms of prudence, benevolence and justice.
Since Hume's days, further factors influencing how we react to the plight of others have been mapped in psychological research, besides associations of similarity and closeness. For instance, various situational factors such as present mood is clearly influential and likewise regarding our sense of certainty with regard to our belief in our perception. Therefore, if I'm really pissed off when being asked to contribute to the Haitian cause I may end up not contributing just because of that, not because I fail to empathize with the victims. Or, if I doubt that my donation will really help these victims or that the situation is really as bad, this may counteract my willingness to give. Other well-known factors are assembled under the headline of framing; properties of the circumstances we are in that influence either our motivation or our tendency to act on it, such as threats or manipulations from other people. Moral thinking, ethical theory and our normative societal institutions (such as the legal system) have found various ways to get around all of these potential hurdles for moral reason to be able flourish. However, there is a further much more disturbing factor, having to do with the spatial-temporal denseness or concentration, and perhaps contrast to what one is accustomed to, of the perceived need.
Already during the aftermath of the Tsunami, UN aid officials pointed out that these sort of death numbers is what is ordinary due to poverty and starvation even in the absence of disastrous events such as storms or earthquakes. Rejoicing the willingness of people to give at the time, they expressed the hope that this willingness would continue in the face of this fact. This did not happen. Similarly, the Haitian death toll equals the number of children that die due to poverty every 10 days! Very many people are perfectly aware of this and there is no government anywhere that does not know these facts. But do they react proportionally to the way they react in the face of the Tsunami or Haiti tragedies? Of course not.
The explanation seems plain and straightforward. Our motivational system makes us prone to respond even to vast needs of many others when this collection of needs is experienced as spatio-temporarily concentrated and salient. Thus our admirable compassion for the victims of the Haitian disaster. But the flip side to that coin is that this property of our motivational system steers our motivation clear of being influenced by clear and certain knowledge of much much larger disasters when these are stretched out over larger portions of space-time and experienced as part of the ordinary. This is what makes us tolerate the ongoing processes that create this situation, some of which have been so well described by Thomas Pogge, rather than respond in a way similar to particular disasters such as the Tsunami or the Haiti earthquake.
Thus, the very source in human nature of the compassion that forms the root of our notion of morality is also the source of a virtual moral abyss. The challenge then seems to be: how do we get around this obvious lack of moral rationality without thereby sacrificing the sort of compassion we are already equipped with?
All of this is in line with the complex model of the human cognitive, emotional and motivational apparatus so famously sketched by David Hume in the 18th century: Besides experiencing and caring for ourselves, we have the evident natural ability to know the plight of others and the innate drive to be motivated by this knowledge. This picture still holds in most respects as modern psychological research and cognitive science advances - in fact, most of what is done in these fields build essentially on the basic psychological models of Hume. Similarly, modern science debunks the simplistic picture of human nature as essentially self-centered and egoistic in much the same way as Hume and his approximate contemporary Bishop Joseph Butler did: All of the tricks employed by advocates of psychological egoism to explain away evidence of non-selfish human motivation rests on a faulty picture of the human cognitive and motivational apparatus. What the psychological egoist would claim about our compassion and willingness to help in the face of the Haiti tragedy is that these things are mere side-effects of our striving for an emotional or material reward. Obviously, we may forget the material side - no one expects anything back from Haiti or its people; we even tolerate and understand that they are many times angry and disappointed at the result of the aid efforts when these fall short of meeting the needs. But the egoist has one more card up his sleeve, namely, the conjecture that we help because we strive for the feeling of satisfaction that being helpful provides. This argument, however, as Butler and Hume pointed out, puts the carriage in front of the horse, since it fails to take into account the source of the feeling of satisfaction: the fact that we need or want to come to aid. This is what motivates us - the emotional reward comes afterward. Modern cognitive science confirms this picture in terms of the biochemistry involved in motivation, emotion and feeling. The role of the neurological reward system is to uphold a system of motivation that in itself is not directed at achieving rewards or avoiding punishment, but at doing whatever it is one strives or wants to do. Only in special circumstances will our motivational attention be directed at the effects of the reward system (such as when we push ourselves to do something that we have a strong motivation not to do).
However, as Hume noted, our motivational capacities are at the same time rather arbitrary when it comes to our relations to other people, depending in turn on what associations between ourselves and others that are present in the mind. So, although we have that natural capacity for perceiving the emotional states of others that Hume called sympathy, and that enables us to identify the feelings, moods and affective states of others in terms of similarity and closeness to our own mental states, what we do in response to such perceptions is a rather open question. Moral reasoning, therefore, has to be about making such responses systematic and coherent, or at least to formulate an ideal pattern of motivational responses that we accept as desirable - the virtues in terms of prudence, benevolence and justice.
Since Hume's days, further factors influencing how we react to the plight of others have been mapped in psychological research, besides associations of similarity and closeness. For instance, various situational factors such as present mood is clearly influential and likewise regarding our sense of certainty with regard to our belief in our perception. Therefore, if I'm really pissed off when being asked to contribute to the Haitian cause I may end up not contributing just because of that, not because I fail to empathize with the victims. Or, if I doubt that my donation will really help these victims or that the situation is really as bad, this may counteract my willingness to give. Other well-known factors are assembled under the headline of framing; properties of the circumstances we are in that influence either our motivation or our tendency to act on it, such as threats or manipulations from other people. Moral thinking, ethical theory and our normative societal institutions (such as the legal system) have found various ways to get around all of these potential hurdles for moral reason to be able flourish. However, there is a further much more disturbing factor, having to do with the spatial-temporal denseness or concentration, and perhaps contrast to what one is accustomed to, of the perceived need.
Already during the aftermath of the Tsunami, UN aid officials pointed out that these sort of death numbers is what is ordinary due to poverty and starvation even in the absence of disastrous events such as storms or earthquakes. Rejoicing the willingness of people to give at the time, they expressed the hope that this willingness would continue in the face of this fact. This did not happen. Similarly, the Haitian death toll equals the number of children that die due to poverty every 10 days! Very many people are perfectly aware of this and there is no government anywhere that does not know these facts. But do they react proportionally to the way they react in the face of the Tsunami or Haiti tragedies? Of course not.
The explanation seems plain and straightforward. Our motivational system makes us prone to respond even to vast needs of many others when this collection of needs is experienced as spatio-temporarily concentrated and salient. Thus our admirable compassion for the victims of the Haitian disaster. But the flip side to that coin is that this property of our motivational system steers our motivation clear of being influenced by clear and certain knowledge of much much larger disasters when these are stretched out over larger portions of space-time and experienced as part of the ordinary. This is what makes us tolerate the ongoing processes that create this situation, some of which have been so well described by Thomas Pogge, rather than respond in a way similar to particular disasters such as the Tsunami or the Haiti earthquake.
Thus, the very source in human nature of the compassion that forms the root of our notion of morality is also the source of a virtual moral abyss. The challenge then seems to be: how do we get around this obvious lack of moral rationality without thereby sacrificing the sort of compassion we are already equipped with?
Tuesday, 9 February 2010
War is hell - even for Swedes
The recent killing of two Swedish soldiers in the Swedish-Finnish contingent of the military international security force in Afghanistan has sent the country known for its almost 200 years of peace into an identity crisis of unprecedented proportions. In a state of baffled shock mixed with an ill-at-ease dabbling with publicly displayed national chauvinistic emotions and expressions usually frowned upon when occurring in other countries (not least our happily nationalistic neighbor, Norway), it is as if my country's collective mentality has suddenly caught up with the fact that we are nowadays actually participating in war for real. People are killed in war - even Swedish soldiers!
Before going on, I need to make the obvious clarification: this is not about ridiculing the near and loved ones of the soldiers killed, or of questioning the obvious fact that their killing is as much a tragedy as any other killing. Rather, what I will say is a confirmation of this: War is hell; hell for everyone - even for Swedes.
What is so strange about the public reaction to the news is the apparent surprise at this elementary fact that it expresses. The responsible military officers that gave the news at a press conference projected one strong feeling: disbelief. "We are the good guys, we take off our helmets in order not to seem threatening to the Afghan civilians", it was as if they were thinking, "this can't happen to us!". But it did, of course, and it was only a matter of time. Everybody knew this deep down, but buried the insight so well, so that now that it actually occurs they stand defenseless.
Interestingly enough, this is far from the first time that Swedish soldiers have been actively involved in military operations abroad, and some Swedish soldiers participating in those ventures have indeed been killed in action - twelve since the 1960's, to be precise. Some of these events have taken place during my adult life, and I remember vividly the sorrow with which the news were relayed, but I can't recall anything like the stunning of an entire people now taking place.
Quite possibly, the reaction can be traced back to a truth so thoroughly denied for some years now: the Afghanistan venture is, unlike the former participation in various peace-keeping operations, about making war for real. What Swedes, Danes, Finns, French, etcetera, soldiers are doing there is no different from what we all have watched as a piece of exotic entertainment in movie after movie about the Vietnam war. For Afghanistan is not a case of a temporary conflict in need of UN buffer to settle down (as Cyprus or Congo). Even less is it a cleaning-up operation to establish a parameter of safety for the victims of devilish bad guys (like Kosovo). The state of Afghanistan is, since several decades back, one of the most primordial types of war - the social chaos where every human being is at the same time the most vulnerable of potential victims and the most vicious of threatening predators. This is hell for anyone, and the attempts to come to grips with the situation so far has only served to sustain the elementary state of things, let alone with some shallow political make up. So Swedish soldiers are making war for real in Afghanistan and indeed it is hell. It always is.
Before going on, I need to make the obvious clarification: this is not about ridiculing the near and loved ones of the soldiers killed, or of questioning the obvious fact that their killing is as much a tragedy as any other killing. Rather, what I will say is a confirmation of this: War is hell; hell for everyone - even for Swedes.
What is so strange about the public reaction to the news is the apparent surprise at this elementary fact that it expresses. The responsible military officers that gave the news at a press conference projected one strong feeling: disbelief. "We are the good guys, we take off our helmets in order not to seem threatening to the Afghan civilians", it was as if they were thinking, "this can't happen to us!". But it did, of course, and it was only a matter of time. Everybody knew this deep down, but buried the insight so well, so that now that it actually occurs they stand defenseless.
Interestingly enough, this is far from the first time that Swedish soldiers have been actively involved in military operations abroad, and some Swedish soldiers participating in those ventures have indeed been killed in action - twelve since the 1960's, to be precise. Some of these events have taken place during my adult life, and I remember vividly the sorrow with which the news were relayed, but I can't recall anything like the stunning of an entire people now taking place.
Quite possibly, the reaction can be traced back to a truth so thoroughly denied for some years now: the Afghanistan venture is, unlike the former participation in various peace-keeping operations, about making war for real. What Swedes, Danes, Finns, French, etcetera, soldiers are doing there is no different from what we all have watched as a piece of exotic entertainment in movie after movie about the Vietnam war. For Afghanistan is not a case of a temporary conflict in need of UN buffer to settle down (as Cyprus or Congo). Even less is it a cleaning-up operation to establish a parameter of safety for the victims of devilish bad guys (like Kosovo). The state of Afghanistan is, since several decades back, one of the most primordial types of war - the social chaos where every human being is at the same time the most vulnerable of potential victims and the most vicious of threatening predators. This is hell for anyone, and the attempts to come to grips with the situation so far has only served to sustain the elementary state of things, let alone with some shallow political make up. So Swedish soldiers are making war for real in Afghanistan and indeed it is hell. It always is.
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