There Is A Question of What We Should Say To Each Other, But It Has Nothing To Do With Limits To Freedom Of Speech

Following recent bloody events in Copenhagen and Paris, with two very similar coordinated deadly attacks against symbolic targets of freedom of speech and religion, there has ensued a completely confused public discussion on the limits of freedom of speech, not seldom implicitly suggesting that maybe the cartoonists at Chalie Hebdo and Lars Vilks (the Swedish artist who co-organised the debate on blasphemy and freedom of speech that was one of the targets of the Copenhagen shooting) had it coming to them. I note that the other two targets in both cases where symbols of Jewish religious practice – a kosher store and a synagogue, respectively – so, I suppose this regards these two as well (?).

The problem with these debates, however, is that they consistently confuse two completely separate normative issues about public communication of information and expressions:

1. What should one publicly communicate / express?

2. What should one be allowed to publicly communicate / express?

Somehow, it seems that almost all of the debaters who have found reason to raise the issue about what the butchered cartoonists in Charlie Hebdo have expressed with this or that picture (mostly in total ignorance of French satirical tradition and using heavily biased selections of images) and Lars Vilks' various actions as an artist and debater (especially the latter is far from nice, aligning himself with semi-fascist groupings, such as Dispatch International), think that this somehow actualises a question of the limits of the freedom of speech. Of course it does not. Not in any way whatsoever.

Freedom of speech is a legal institutional arrangement, whereby the state takes upon itself not to prosecute public communications / expressions (and to protect people from other people's attempts to prevent or punish such acts with unlawful means). All liberal democratic states have limits to these arrangements, but as a rule, these limits are only about independently defined crimes, such as libel or unlawful harassment or threat, or endangering public order, instigating riots, violence or other criminal acts of others. The issue of whether or not a public communication / expression is morally OK has nothing to do with it. Of course, these limits mean that all people enjoying this type of right have a reason to moderate their behaviour. Moreover, if they want to have as wide license as possible, they have reason to act in their public communication in ways not approaching the legal limits, e.g., in line with the classic example of J.S. Mill, avoiding inflammatory tones and biases in front of large masses of angry people in order not to stir up a riot, while still expressing criticism of some person of phenomenon. However, the issue of whether or not this expression is morally warranted or not is of no consequence at all for determining such limits of free speech.

Having said that, there is, of course, a moral question of how we, as individuals, should behave towards each other. We may have reasons to be considerate and to moderate our ways of communicating our opinions and feelings. In general, we have reason not to harm each other in any way, unless there are good reasons for it. This includes things such as upsetting others, making them feel disrespected and so on. In other words, when communicating publicly we all owe consideration to each other, in a way no different from other kinds of actions. And, of course, it holds equally for all agents (in proportion to the good and the damage they may do) – e.g., religious clerics, political campaigners, journalists, and so on. But, of course, this reason may be balanced by other ones, such as the value of undermining the authority of oppressing institutions and practices, of having victims of such institutions experiencing public support and so on, of promoting worthy causes, and so on. But, and here we are, none of this has anything at all to do with the limits of the freedom of speech. To demonstrate that beyond all doubt, we may only reflect on the simple fact that the moral considerations just described hold entirely independent of whether or not a state enforces freedom of speech or not. We would owe each other consideration also under the most oppressing of tyrannies.

So, in light of the obvious fact that the recent attacks are deliberately directed against the institution of the freedom of speech – they tell us: if you keep this freedom, we will murder you for using it – in light of this, raising the moral issue is completely out of place. Its only fathomable function can be to muddle the water as to the weight and importance of standing up for the freedom of speech. In effect, it unwittingly (I hope!) sides with the attackers. For, to side with the victims of the murders – to declare "Je Suis Charlie!" or whatever other expression of solidarity is – of course! – not to condone them as morally splendid people, but to take stand for the freedom of speech. The same holds, of course, for the victims of the attacks against religious Jewish targets – to side with their right to practice their religion without being murdered is not to side with or even like Judaism, or religion at all for that matter.

Now Online: Special Symposium of Public Health Ethics: New Media, Risky Behaviour and Children

All good to those who wait, it's said, and in this case this certainly holds up to scrutiny...

 

Yesterday afternoon, a special symposium in this year's first issue of the journal Public Health Ethics, guest-edited by myself and my colleague Karl Persson de Fine Licht, on the topic of New Media, Risky Behaviour and Children, went online after about 2 years of work, starting with this call for papers. In addition, the call came out of a preceding European project, running 2011-12, taking off as an original idea at a workshop we held in Gothenburg in October 2011. We are, of course, mighty grateful to the PHE editors-in-chief duo of Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij, who accepted our proposal, remained committed to it and has offered all support needed under way.

The full table of content looks like this:

Introduction 
Christian Munthe and Karl Persson de Fine Licht
Editorial: New Media and Risky Behavior of Children and Young People: Ethics and Policy Implications. Introducing the Themes and Pushing for More 

Original articles
Julika Loss, Verena Lindacher, and Janina Curbach
Do Social Networking Sites Enhance the Attractiveness of Risky Health Behavior? Impression Management in Adolescents’ Communication on Facebook and its Ethical Implications

Joakim Forsemalm
Consolidated Youth Jury: Alcohol Prevention for Young People from Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. A Swedish Case Report
  
K. P. Mehta, J. Coveney, P. Ward, and E. Handsley
Parents’ and Children’s Perceptions of the Ethics of Marketing Energy-Dense Nutrient-Poor Foods on the Internet: Implications for Policy to Restrict Children’s Exposure 

Boudewijn de Bruin
Alcohol in the Media and Young People: What Do We Need for Liberal Policy-making?

Case Discussion  

Kate L. Mandeville, Matthew Harris, H. Lucy Thomas, Yimmy Chow, and Claude Seng 

Using Social Networking Sites for Communicable Disease Control: Innovative Contact Tracing or Breach of Confidentiality?

Jasper Littmann and Anthony Kessel 

Accounting for the Costs of Contact Tracing through Social Networks  

André Krom 

From Facebook to Tracebook: A Justified Means to Prevent Infection Risks? 

Mart L. Stein, Babette O. Rump, Mirjam E. E. Kretzschmar, and Jim E. van Steenbergen 

Social Networking Sites as a Tool for Contact Tracing: Urge for Ethical Framework for Normative Guidance

David M. Shaw 

Communicating About Communicable Diseases on Facebook: Whisper, Don’t Shout  

Thomas Ploug and Søren Holm 

Take Not a Musket to Kill a Butterfly—Ensuring the Proportionality of Measures Used in Disease Control on the Internet

Now, I would myself very much have preferred to have the entire issue open access, for anyone to probe, but since that would cost about €1500 / article, and there are 11 articles in the symposium, there was no financially feasible way of managing this. One of the contributions is open access, due to it having been written in a context where funding for that objective has been available, but this is normally not the case for ethicists, social scientists and practitioners – unlike our more wealthy cousins within clinical and laboratory health science, I might add.

For access, your best bet is through a university library, a student or staff at a university with access, or you can try contacting individual authors and/or look around for so-called postprints posted in public archives.